Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction

Duffy, John; Ochs, Jack

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.07.003

Cited by 230 publications

(196 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Our findings are consistent with earlier findings that subjects cooperate and punish in the last round of the standard version of these experiments, as there too there is 7 Duffy and Ochs [2009] show that subjects play non-cooperatively in a prisoner's dilemma with stochastic end date and anonymous random matching, while they play cooperatively in a control with fixed pairs. See Kandori [1992] and Ellison [1993] for calculations of the discount factor required for contagion to be an equilibrium in infinitely-repeated games with anonymous random matching.…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Fudenberg

Pathak²

2010

Journal of Public Economics

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Abstract:Costly punishment can facilitate cooperation in public-goods games, as human subjects will incur costs to punish non-cooperators even in settings where it is unlikely that they will face the same opponents again. Understanding when and why it occurs is important both for the design of economic institutions and for modeling the evolution of cooperation. Our experiment shows that subjects will engage in costly punishment even when it will not be observed until the end of the session, which supports the view that agents enjoy punishment. Moreover, players continue to cooperate when punishment is unobserved, perhaps because they (correctly) anticipate that shirkers will be punished: Fear of punishment can be as effective at promoting contributions as punishment itself.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 92%

Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Fudenberg

Pathak²

2010

Journal of Public Economics

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“…On the other hand, the existence of strategic cooperation is suggested by differences in cooperation between random-matching and fixed-matching treatments, which have been found in bribery games (Abbink 2004), principal-agent games (Cochard and Willinger 2005), trust games (Huck et al 2006), conflict games (Lacomba et al 2010), prisoner's dilemma games (Duffy and Ochs 2009), gift-exchange games (Gächter and Falk 2002), and public good games (Croson 1996;Keser and van Winden 2000). In contrast, Andreoni (1988) finds more cooperation under random matching (for an explanation of these mixed results see Andreoni and Croson 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

Reuben

Suetens

2011

Exp Econ

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We propose a novel experimental method that disentangles strategicallyand non-strategically-motivated behavior. We apply it to an indefinitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma game to observe simultaneously how the same individual behaves in situations with future interaction and in situations with no future interaction, while controlling for expectations. This method allows us to determine the extent to which strategically-cooperating individuals are responsible for the observed pattern of cooperation in experiments with repeated interaction, including the so-called endgame effect. Our results indicate that the most common motive for cooperation in repeated games is strategic.

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“…Schwartz, Young, and Zvinakis (2000), Camera andCasari (2009), andGong andYang (2010) all find that observing an opponent's history of play significantly increases cooperation, though Duffy and Ochs (2009) do not observe this effect in their data. In all of these studies, subjects are aware that their actions will be revealed to future opponents.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 95%

Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

et al. 2015

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. (2015) 'Revealed reputations in the nitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma.', Economic theory., 58 (3). pp. 441-484. Further information on publisher's website:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1Publisher's copyright statement:The nal publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1. Additional information:Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Abstract In a sequential-move, finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma game (FRPD), cooperation can be sustained if the first-mover believes her opponent might be a behavioral type who plays a tit-for-tat strategy in every period. We test this theory by revealing second-mover histories from an earlier FRPD experiment to their current opponent. Despite eliminating the possibility of reputation building, aggregate cooperation actually increases when histories are revealed. Cooperative histories lead to increased trust, but negative histories do not cause decreased trust. We develop a behavioral model to explain these findings.

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Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction

Cited by 230 publications

References 20 publications

Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Unobserved punishment supports cooperation

Revisiting strategic versus non-strategic cooperation

Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

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