Cooperative spectrum sensing schemes for cognitive radios using dynamic spectrum auctions

Sendrei, Lukas; Pastirčak, Ján; Marchevsky, S.; Gazda, Juraj

doi:10.1109/tsp.2015.7296243

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Generally, the study on the spectrum trading is unfolded in the following approaches: At first, in order to achieve the demand balance between spectrum owners and secondary buyers, online auction with unknown or fixed spectrum supplies is proposed to enable reusability-driven spectrum allocation [28], [29]. Particularly, the truthful auction mechanism is the key issue during the course which attracts lots of attention.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preference-Based Spectrum Pricing in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

Sheng

Hua

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.

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(2016) Preference-based spectrum pricing in dynamic spectrum access networks. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing (99). ISSN 1939ISSN -1374 This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/61903/ This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published version. Copyright and reuse:Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available.Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. Abstract-With market-driven secondary spectrum trading, licensed users can receive benefits in terms of monetary rewards or various transmission services, thus setting a fair pricing structure by suitably defining spectrum quality characteristics and accurately addressing participant's requirement is a key issue. In this paper, we investigate the pricing-based spectrum access by casting the problem of spectrum pricing into a Hotelling game model according to spectrum quality diversity. Particularly, we first build a pricing system model where unused spectrum from primary systems with different qualities forms a spectrum pool and can be divided into a number of uniform channels. A secondary user purchases a channel for usage according to its selection preference which is closely related to the channel quality and spectrum evaluation. The secondary user not only needs to consider the channel's quality and price, but also the interference cost on primary system. Detailed analysis on the policy preference of both primary system and secondary buyer are provided. By forming a game problem of spectrum pricing between primary and secondary users, we apply the Hotelling game model to handle the interaction between the participants. Specifically, by fixing Nash equilibrium of the game, an iterative algorithm for spectrum pricing is proposed based on the distribution characteristics of secondary user's preference. Essential analysis for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium along with algorithm's convergence conditions are provided. Numerical results are also supplemented to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in ensuring spectrum owner's profit.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%