Abstract-In this paper we propose two novel coalitional game theory based optimization methods for minimizing the cost of electricity consumed by households from a smart community. Some households in the community may own renewable energy sources (RESs) conjoined with energy storage systems (ESSs). Some other residences own ESSs only, while the remaining households are simple energy consumers. We first propose a coalitional cost optimization method in which RESs and ESSs owners exchange energy and share their renewable energy and storage spaces. We show that by participating in the proposed game these households may considerably reduce their costs in comparison to performing individual cost optimization. We further propose another coalitional optimization model in which RESs and ESSs owning households not only share their resources, but also sell energy to simple energy consuming households. We show that through this energy trade the RESs and ESSs owners can further reduce their costs, while the simple energy consumers also gain cost savings. The cost savings obtained by the coalition are distributed among its members according to the Shapley value. Simulation examples show that the proposed coalitional optimization methods may reduce the electricity costs for the RESs and ESSs owning households by 18%, while the sole energy consumers may reduce their costs by 3%.Index Terms-Coalitional game, demand side management, smart households, renewable energy, energy storage, cost reduction.
NOMENCLATURE
Abbreviations
DSM Demand side management ESS Energy storage system RES Renewable energy sourceSets, cardinalities and indicesOptimization period, number of time-slots, and their index N , N, n Households in the community, their number, and index M, M, m Households owning RESs and/or ESSs (grand coalition), their number, and index P, P, p Sole energy consuming households, their number, and index G, G, gHouseholds forming a coalition, their number, and indexWe acknowledge the financial support received from KAUTE Foundation for the research reported in this article.The Cost incurred by household m, g in periodPayoff assigned to a player m by Shapley value This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TSG.2017.2784902, IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid 2 a n,m,p (t) Amount of energy exchanged by household n, m, p with other households in time-slot t b n,m,p (t) Amount of energy bought by household n, m, p from utility company in time-slot t