Coordination and culture

Carvalho, Jean‐Paul

doi:10.1007/s00199-016-0990-3

Cited by 19 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Carvalho (2017). The model of Carvalho (2017) addresses the evolution of inter-group coordination behavior when individuals may engage in behavior that does not necessarily correspond with how they would prefer to behave. Like the model of Kuran and Sandholm (2008), this model permits discordance of behavior and preferences (norms), yet, at any given time, individuals are not permitted to tailor their behavior to that of their interaction partner.…”

Section: A1 Interaction Models With Mixed Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural Diversity in Unequal Societies Sustained Through Cross-Cultural Competence and Identity Valuation

Bunce¹

2020

Preprint

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In much contemporary political discourse, valued cultural characteristics are threatened by interaction with culturally-distinct others, such as immigrants or a hegemonic majority. Such interaction often fosters cross-cultural competence (CCC), the ability to interact successfully across cultural boundaries. However most theories of cultural dynamics ignore CCC, making cultural diversity incompatible with mutually-beneficial inter-group interaction, and contributing to fears of cultural loss. Here, new theory, incorporating competing developmental paths to CCC and group identity valuation, illuminates how a common strategy of disempowered minorities can counter-intuitively sustain cultural diversity: Given strong group identity, minorities in a structurally-unequal, integrative society can maintain their distinctive cultural norms by learning those of the majority. Simple field methods in an Amazonian population demonstrate how to assess such strategies' effectiveness given predicted dynamics.

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Section: A1 Interaction Models With Mixed Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural Diversity in Unequal Societies Sustained Through Cross-Cultural Competence and Identity Valuation

Bunce¹

2020

Preprint

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“…If a → 1 + this difference approaches − f (∆x * ) < 0, hence welfare is higher under the bottom-contributor comparison method. If a ≥ 9/7 we get by Lemma A2 and by the monotonicity of f (•) that ∆x * <x ⇒ f (∆x * ) < f (x) = kx = (1 − a/3)x, implying that the welfare difference given by (4) is greater than (a − 1) (3x − ∆x * ) − (1 − a/3)x > 2 (a − 1)x − (1 − a/3)x = 7 3 a − 3 x ≥ 0.…”

Section: Conflicts Of Interestmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Examples of such settings would be choosing what side of the road to drive or, for situations where agents disagree about the preferred convention, when to have public holidays. The strength of and adherence to descriptive social norms has been studied by Michaeli and Spiro [6] and Carvalho [7]. this paper, describe a "commonly approved" behavior (Cialdini et al [1], p. 202; see also Krupka and Weber [8]).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Prescriptive Norms and Social Comparisons

Michaeli

Spiro

2018

Games

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This paper analyzes the equilibrium strength of prescriptive norms to contribute to public goods. We consider three methods of establishing what an acceptable contribution to the public good is. Under the first method, the contribution of the bottom contributor is the reference point by which the comparison is being made; under the second, the median contribution is the reference point; and under the third the top contribution is the reference. The first method results in a unique equilibrium and the reference contribution is endogenously low. Each of the latter two methods allows for multiple equilibria differing in contributions made and thus in the strength of the norm to contribute. Comparing the methods we show that the median reference allows for the highest equilibrium contributions and welfare of all methods hence is the preferred method if, among the multiple equilibria, the best one can be selected. However, the bottom-reference is the maximin method, i.e., it provides safe minimal aggregate contribution and welfare that surpass the worst outcome in the other two methods.

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“…6 In an example of this, Algan et al (2013) find an economically significant trade-off faced by Arabic parents in France between attachment to their own culture (in their study, the desire to pass on an Arabic name) with the future economic performance of their children in the form of work-related penalties to having an Arabic name. This is an important trade-off and is present in varying forms in Kuran and Sandholm (2008), Lazear (1999), Bisin et al (2011), Carvalho (2013b, and Carvalho (2013a), amongst others.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…11 In Lazear (1999) and Carvalho (2013a), agents choose a cultural practice, but take interaction as given. A second literature models link formation in order to study the important concept of homophily -the tendency for similar individuals to be linked.…”

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confidence: 99%

Melting pot or salad bowl: the formation of heterogeneous communities

Advani¹,

Reich

2015

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Relatively little is known about what determines whether a heterogenous population ends up in a cooperative or divisive situation. This paper proposes a theoretical model to understand what social structures arise in heterogeneous populations. Individuals face a trade-off between cultural and economic incentives: an individual prefers to maintain his cultural practices, but doing so can inhibit interaction and economic exchange with those who adopt different practices. We find that a small minority group will adopt majority cultural practices and integrate. In contrast, minority groups above a certain critical mass, may retain diverse practices and may also segregate from the majority. The size of this critical mass depends on the cultural distance between groups, the importance of culture in day to day life, and the costs of forming a social tie. We test these predictions using data on migrants to the United States in the era of mass migration, and find support for the existence of a critical mass of migrants above which social structure in heterogeneous populations changes discretely towards cultural distinction and segregation.

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Coordination and culture

Cited by 19 publications

References 59 publications

Cultural Diversity in Unequal Societies Sustained Through Cross-Cultural Competence and Identity Valuation

Cultural Diversity in Unequal Societies Sustained Through Cross-Cultural Competence and Identity Valuation

Prescriptive Norms and Social Comparisons

Melting pot or salad bowl: the formation of heterogeneous communities

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