Veiling among Muslim women is modeled as a commitment mechanism that limits temptation to deviate from religious norms of behavior. The analysis suggests that veiling is a strategy for integration, enabling women to take up outside economic opportunities while preserving their reputation within the community. This accounts for puzzling features of the new veiling movement since the 1970s. Veiling also has surprising effects on the intergenerational transmission of values. Compulsory veiling laws can lead to a decline in religiosity. Bans on veiling can inhibit social integration and increase religiosity.

Muslim societies have been reshaped in recent decades by an Islamic revival. We document a contemporaneous decline in social mobility among educated youth in Egypt, the epicentre of the movement in the Arab world. We then develop a model to show how an unexpected decline in social mobility combined with inequality can produce a religious revival led by the educated middle class. The principal idea is that religion helps individuals to cope with unfulfilled aspirations by adjusting their expectations-based reference point. By raising aspirations, economic development may make societies more prone to religious revivals. 2 Clemens et al. (2009) and Campante and Chor (2012), among others, have also documented that over recent decades increases in education have not been matched with increases in economic opportunities in Egypt and the Middle East more generally. Campante and Chor (2012) link political protest during the Arab spring to these factors. To our knowledge, none of these studies examined changes in social mobility among the educated. We also focus on a different time period, during which major changes took place both in the Egyptian labour market and in society at large.

No abstract

Culture constrains individual choice by making certain behaviours taboo. We propose an evolutionary model in which members of different groups attempt to coordinate over time. We show that cultural constraints can lead to a permanent break down in coordination between groups, even when coordination is attainable and Pareto-efficient. Hence restrictive cultures make coordination with out-group members more difficult. By limiting a person's options, however, highly restrictive cultures act as a strategic commitment, forcing out-group members to conform to in-group norms if they want to coordinate. In this way, cultural constraints on behaviour may lead to higher expected welfare. When people rationally choose their culture, we demonstrate that restrictive and permissive cultures can co-exist in the long run.

No abstract