Coordination, Conventions and the Self-organisation of Sustainable Institutions

Pitt, Jeremy; Schaumeier, Julia; Artikis, Alexander

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25044-6_17

Cited by 10 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…This aligns with similar results by Pitt et al [8]. By contrast, the copy-satisfied-if-dissatisfied learning rule captures complacency of satisfied agents, who, due to their satisfaction, do not change their strategy.…”

Section: Impact Of Different Forms Of Social Learningsupporting

confidence: 90%

Social and Asocial Learning in Collective Action Problems: The Rise and Fall of Socially-Beneficial Behaviour

Lewis

Ekárt

2017

2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems (FAS*W)

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Abstract-The allocation of common-pool resources is an important topic in technical and socio-technical systems, and when left unmanaged, such systems often collapse to highly unequal and unsustainable outcomes. Recent work has highlighted a role for electronic institutions in managing such resources, to ensure socially-beneficial outcomes in the long term. However, open self-organising multi-agent systems often involve agents that learn behaviours in order to meet their goals. In this paper we explore the interplay between institutional features and forms of social and asocial learning employed by self-interested agents. We show that, while recent results have associated social learning with sustainability, this is sensitive to the form of social learning used. We show that more realistic models that combine social and asocial learning are more likely to lead to unsustainable institutions and anti-social outcomes. However, a key role for pardons in the sanction mechanism of the institution is identified, which allows for tolerance of a range of behaviours associated with ongoing learning, including complacency and exploration.

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Section: Impact Of Different Forms Of Social Learningsupporting

confidence: 90%

Social and Asocial Learning in Collective Action Problems: The Rise and Fall of Socially-Beneficial Behaviour

Lewis

Ekárt

2017

2017 IEEE 2nd International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems (FAS*W)

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“…However, our approach to aid the translation of interpretable contracts into codified institutional representations does not exist in isolation. Pitt et al [12] describe an approach that is inspired by Ostrom's institutional framework [6] and uses event calculus to represent nested institutional rule sets in self-organising systems. Similarly, da Silva Figueiredo et al [13] propose a generic description language that formalises the norm specifications comprehensively, similar to the nADICO structure used in this work.…”

Section: Summary Discussion and Outlookmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Institutions to Code: Towards Automated Generation of Smart Contracts

Frantz¹,

Nowostawski²

2016

2016 IEEE 1st International Workshops on Foundations and Applications of Self* Systems (FAS*W)

169

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Abstract-Blockchain technology has emerged as a solution to consistency problems in peer to peer networks. By now, it has matured as a solution to a range of use cases in which it can effectively provide the notion of third party trust without the need for a trusted (physical) third party, which makes it an attractive coordination mechanism for distributed systems. To promote the wide adoption of this technology, we yet lack mechanisms that make the specification and interpretation of smart contracts accessible to a broader audience. In this work, we propose a modeling approach that supports the semi-automated translation of human-readable contract representations into computational equivalents in order to enable the codification of laws into verifiable and enforceable computational structures that reside within a public blockchain. We identify smart contract components that correspond to real world institutions, and propose a mapping that we operationalize using a domain-specific language in order to support the contract modeling process. We explore this capability based on selected examples and plot out directions for future research on smart contracts.

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“…In Pitt et al [2011c], we have also considered the case of endogenous resource provision and cluster formation using the Linear Public Good game [Gaechter 2006]. This game is concerned with provision and appropriation of resources, in which individual utility is maximized by free-riding (i.e., providing nothing and appropriating an equal share) if everyone else provides a full share, but minimized if everyone tries to free-ride.…”

Section: Related Work and Further Research Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Axiomatization of Socio-Economic Principles for Self-Organizing Institutions

Pitt

Schaumeier

Artikis

2012

ACM Trans. Auton. Adapt. Syst.

Self Cite

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We address the problem of engineering self-organizing electronic institutions for resource allocation in open, embedded, and resource-constrained systems. In such systems, there is decentralized control, competition for resources and an expectation of both intentional and unintentional errors. The "optimal" distribution of resources is then less important than the endurance of the distribution mechanism. Under these circumstances, we propose to model resource allocation as a common-pool resource management problem, and develop a formal characterization of Elinor Ostrom's socio-economic principles for self-governing institutions. This article applies a method for sociologically inspired computing to give a complete axiomatization of six of Ostrom's eight principles in the Event Calculus. A testbed is implemented for experimenting with the axiomatization. The experimental results show that these principles support enduring institutions, in terms of longevity and membership, and also provide insight into calibrating the transaction and running costs associated with implementing the principles against the behavioral profile of the institutional membership. We conclude that it is possible to express Ostrom's principles in logical form and that they are necessary and sufficient conditions for enduring self-organizing electronic institutions to manage sustainable common-pool resources.

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Coordination, Conventions and the Self-organisation of Sustainable Institutions

Cited by 10 publications

References 14 publications

Social and Asocial Learning in Collective Action Problems: The Rise and Fall of Socially-Beneficial Behaviour

Social and Asocial Learning in Collective Action Problems: The Rise and Fall of Socially-Beneficial Behaviour

From Institutions to Code: Towards Automated Generation of Smart Contracts

Axiomatization of Socio-Economic Principles for Self-Organizing Institutions

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