We address the problem of engineering self-organizing electronic institutions for resource allocation in open, embedded, and resource-constrained systems. In such systems, there is decentralized control, competition for resources and an expectation of both intentional and unintentional errors. The "optimal" distribution of resources is then less important than the endurance of the distribution mechanism. Under these circumstances, we propose to model resource allocation as a common-pool resource management problem, and develop a formal characterization of Elinor Ostrom's socio-economic principles for self-governing institutions. This article applies a method for sociologically inspired computing to give a complete axiomatization of six of Ostrom's eight principles in the Event Calculus. A testbed is implemented for experimenting with the axiomatization. The experimental results show that these principles support enduring institutions, in terms of longevity and membership, and also provide insight into calibrating the transaction and running costs associated with implementing the principles against the behavioral profile of the institutional membership. We conclude that it is possible to express Ostrom's principles in logical form and that they are necessary and sufficient conditions for enduring self-organizing electronic institutions to manage sustainable common-pool resources.

Two principles of enduring institutions for selforganising resource allocation are congruence of the allocation method to the resources available, and participation of those affected by the allocation (the appropriators) in selecting that method. However, the principles do not say anything explicitly about the fairness of the allocation method, or the outcomes. In this paper, we complement these principles with canons of distributive justice represented as legitimate claims, which are implemented as voting functions that determine the order in which resource requests are satisfied. The appropriators vote on the weight attached to the scoring functions, and so selforganise the allocation method. Experiments with a variation of the Linear Public Good game show that this pluralistic selforganising approach produces a better balance of utility and fairness (for agents that comply with the rules of the game) than monistic or fixed approaches.

Abstract-We are interested in engineering for open, embedded and resource-constrained systems, which have applications in ad hoc, sensor and opportunistic networks. In such systems, there is decentralised control, competition for resources and an expectation of both intentional and unintentional errors. The 'optimal' distribution of resources is then less important than the 'robustness' or 'survivability' of the distribution mechanism, based on collective decision-making and tolerance of unintentional errors. We therefore seek to model resource allocation in the network as a common pool resource management problem, and apply a formal characterisation of Ostrom's socio-economic principles for building enduring institutions. This paper presents a complete axiomatisation in the Event Calculus of six of Ostrom's eight principles, describes a preliminary testbed for experimenting with the axiomatisation, and considers the work from a methodological perspective of sociologically-inspired computing for self-organising systems.

No abstract

No abstract