Provision and Appropriation of Common-Pool Resources without Full Disclosure

Two principles of enduring institutions for selforganising resource allocation are congruence of the allocation method to the resources available, and participation of those affected by the allocation (the appropriators) in selecting that method. However, the principles do not say anything explicitly about the fairness of the allocation method, or the outcomes. In this paper, we complement these principles with canons of distributive justice represented as legitimate claims, which are implemented as voting functions that determine the order in which resource requests are satisfied. The appropriators vote on the weight attached to the scoring functions, and so selforganise the allocation method. Experiments with a variation of the Linear Public Good game show that this pluralistic selforganising approach produces a better balance of utility and fairness (for agents that comply with the rules of the game) than monistic or fixed approaches.

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“…The effect of relaxing these assumptions, in the context of retributive justice, is investigated in [6].…”

Section: Legitimate Claims In Lpgmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the LPG game makes several assumptions, so to study resource allocation in open systems, we utilise a variation, LPG [6].…”

Section: The Linear Public Good Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Self-Organising Common-Pool Resource Allocation and Canons of Distributive Justice

Pitt

Schaumeier

Busquets

et al. 2012

2012 IEEE Sixth International Conference on Self-Adaptive and Self-Organizing Systems

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“…Our approach is thus closer to other logic-based simulation. For example, [7] showed that in situations where the cost of enforcement is sufficiently high, a certain level of non-compliance can be tolerated, supposing that the compliers were willing to indulge few 'enfant terribles' for the sake of the collective. As more and more compliers became non-compliers then 'the system' had to start doing the monitoring and imposing the enforcement, and paying the costs of doing so.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Vicarious reinforcement and ex ante law enforcement

Riveret

Contissa

Busquets

et al. 2013

Proceedings of the Fourteenth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law

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We propose a model of vicarious reinforcement in rule-based learning agents. The influence of this reinforcement is investigated in a population where a law is enforced ex ante. The norm-governed population of learning agents is formalised and simulated in an executable probabilistic rule-based argumentation framework. Vicarious experiences are expressed with rules and their learning effects are integrated into reinforcement learning. So, agents learn not only from their own experiences but also by taking into account the experiences of others. We show that simulation results differ from traditional calculus based on expected utilities.

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“…The LPG game makes a number of assumptions, particularly that there is full disclosure, that no monitoring costs are incurred, that there is no cheating on appropriation, and that there are no diminishing returns. The assumptions have to be relaxed in open systems with an economy of scarcity, so to study resource allocation in this context, we utilise a variant game, LPG [Pitt and Schaumeier 2012].…”

Section: The Linear Public Good Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Distributive Justice for Self-Organised Common-Pool Resource Management

Pitt

Busquets

Macbeth

2014

ACM Trans. Auton. Adapt. Syst.

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In this article, we complement Elinor Ostrom's institutional design principles for enduring common-pool resource management with Nicholas Rescher's theory of distributive justice based on the canon of legitimate claims. Two of Ostrom's principles are that the resource allocation method should be congruent with the local environment, and that those affected by the allocation method (the appropriators) should participate in its selection. However, these principles do not say anything explicitly about the fairness of the allocation method or the outcomes it produces: for this, we need a mechanism for distributive justice. Rescher identified a number of different mechanisms, each of which had both its merits and demerits, and instead maintained that distributive justice consisted in identifying the legitimate claims in context, accommodating multiple claims in case of plurality, and reconciling them in case of conflict. Accordingly, we specify a logical axiomatisation of the principles with the canon of legitimate claims, whereby a set of claims is each represented as a voting function, which collectively determine the rank order in which resources are allocated. The appropriators vote on the weight attached to the scoring functions, and so self-organise the allocation method, taking into account both the plurality of and conflict between the claims. Therefore, the appropriators exercise collective choice over the method, and the method itself is congruent with the local environment, taking into account both the resources available and the relative claims of the appropriators. Experiments with a variant of the linear public good game show that this pluralistic self-organising approach produces a better balance of utility and fairness (for agents that comply with the rules of the game) compared to monistic or fixed approaches, provide "fairness over time" (a series of ostensibly unfair individual allocations is revealed to be cumulatively fair), and offer an intuition of how to resolve the free-rider phenomenon in provision and appropriation of common-pool resources.

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Provision and Appropriation of Common-Pool Resources without Full Disclosure

Cited by 20 publications

References 13 publications

Self-Organising Common-Pool Resource Allocation and Canons of Distributive Justice

Self-Organising Common-Pool Resource Allocation and Canons of Distributive Justice

Vicarious reinforcement and ex ante law enforcement

Distributive Justice for Self-Organised Common-Pool Resource Management

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