Coordination Mechanism of Cooperative Ambidextrous Innovation of Graphene Enterprises

Abstract

The development of graphene enterprises can play an important role in promoting the graphene and other industries, further contributing to the operation of society. Cooperative ambidextrous innovation is an important strategy for graphene manufacturer and graphene application enterprises. To explore the coordination mechanism of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of graphene enterprises, this paper constructs the evolutionary game model between graphene manufacturer and downstream application enterprises. We analyze the stability of evolution strategies and influential factors in interfirm coordination of cooperative ambidextrous innovation. Furthermore, the paper builds a numerical model to simulate the probabilistic evolution trend and dynamic evolution process among different types of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of graphene enterprises. The results also show that for each type, increasing excess revenue and penalty costs have positive driving effects on the coordination behavior of cooperative ambidextrous innovation of the graphene manufacturer and application enterprises. Only by controlling the allocation coefficient of excess revenue and the risk-taking coefficient in the reasonable range can significant roles be achieved to the greatest favorable extent. INDEX TERMS Cooperative ambidextrous innovation, coordination mechanism, evolutionary game theory, graphene enterprises.

What makes innovation ambidexterity manageable: a systematic review, multi-level model and future challenges

“…Studies concerning the impact of collaboration consider concepts such as inter-organisational collaboration between partners (e.g., customers, competitors, and suppliers) (Lazzarotti et al 2017 ; Doghri et al 2021 ), ties for collaboration (Zhang et al 2019 ; Xie et al 2020 ), platform ecosystems (Inoue 2021 ), value co-creation capabilities (Tsai 2017 ), and coordination mechanisms (Yin and Su 2019 ). In contrast, studies on orientation as a process mechanism report differential focus and links with IA.…”

Behavioral Selection Strategies of Members of Enterprise Community of Practice—An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach to the Knowledge Creation Process

“…According to relevant theories, literature and experts' consultation results, as well as the comprehensive consideration of the variables and influencing factors that may be involved (because the real scenario of knowledge creation is so complex, there may be other influencing factors we did not take into account), we conduct a simulation analysis to show the complex behavioral selection strategy of community members in the knowledge creation process as much as possible. Compared with related literature [21], [28], it is remarkable that we believe each of members will pay the cost of knowledge creation (S) when both community members select conflict strategy and carry out knowledge creation independently.…”

“…(1) The relevant parameters are set according to related references, experts' opinions and reality as follows [28], [32]. α=0.3, β=0.4, ΔG=15, G=10, S=9, L=10, M=8, and substitute the parameters into the replication dynamic equation of community member i and member j.…”

“…The closer the point E is to the origin, the greater the probability that the community members will select the collaboration strategy. Second, the probability of one member selecting the collaboration strategy will have an impact on the probability of the other member selecting the collaboration strategy, which also proves the essence of the strategy selection of the game subject in the evolutionary game process [21], [25], [28]. When the probability of one member selecting the collaboration strategy is greater than a certain value, the probability of the other member selecting the collaboration strategy will eventually approach 1, and the convergence speed will get faster and faster with the increasing of the probability of selecting the collaboration strategy.…”

Evolutionary Game and Simulation of Subject Risk Management Behavior in Construction Stage of Engineering Project Based on Strong Reciprocity and Prospect Theory

“…Based on the above assumptions, a risk-benefit perception matrix of the risk management behaviors between owner and contractor in the construction stage of an engineering project can be constructed, as shown in Table 1 [33]. Owner(a)…”