Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount

Yue, Jiguang; Austin, Jill; Wang, Min-Chiang; Huang, Zhimin

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2004.05.005

Cited by 248 publications

(125 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…To facilitate calculations and center our focus on carbon emission reduction, we establish assumption A2 as a similar way as in [42,43], aiming to suppress the influence of wholesale and retail pricing decisions. We set the deterministic demand function ( , ) …”

Section: Decision Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Zhao

Lei

2015

Sustainability

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Abstract:We study an emission-dependent dyadic fashion supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their own component/product emissions to serve the carbon-footprint sensitive consumers. With Carbon Tax regulation, we consider four scenarios resulting from two ways in form of adopting transfer price contract and/or introducing third-party emission-reduction service (TPERS) to enhance the efficiency of systematic emission reductions. We refine four models from these corresponding scenarios, which in turn constitute a decision-making framework composed of determining vertical incentives and choosing supply chain structures. By exploiting Stackelberg games in all models, we compare their emission reduction efficiencies and profitability for each pair of settings. Theoretic analysis and numerical studies show that adopting vertical transfer payment schemes can definitely benefit channel carbon footprint reduction and Pareto improvement of supply chain profitability, regardless of whether the emissionreduction service exists or not. However, whether introducing TPERS or not is heavily depending on systematic parameters when the transfer payment incentive is adopted there. We also provide insights on the sensitivity of carbon tax parameters with respect to the supply chain performance, overall carbon emission reduction, vertical incentive and TPERS adopting decision-makings. OPEN ACCESSSustainability 2015, 7 4281

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Section: Decision Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Zhao

Lei

2015

Sustainability

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“…Yue et al [15] study the issue of cooperative advertisement in a production-distribution supply chain in which the demand is sensitive to the price and the manufacturer o ers price discounts to the distributor. Szmerekovsky and Zhang [16] investigate the issue of pricing and determination of advertising policy in a bi-level supply chain where the demand depends on the retail price and advertising expenditure.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to the assumptions made by [15,17], the demand function of each market can be considered as follows: where z k denotes the size of the kth market, and functions g k (p) and h k (a k ; A) re ect the e ects of selling price (p), local advertising cost in the kth market (a k ), and global advertising cost (A) on the market's demand.…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A bi-level programming model for decentralized manufacturer-distributer supply chain considering cooperative advertising

2017

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Abstract. This paper studies a bi-level decentralized supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one distributor. Along with global advertising, the manufacturer participates in part of local advertising expenditure incurred by the distributor. Bi-level programming is applied to model the relationship between the manufacturer and distributer under two power scenarios of Stackelberg game framework. In the rst scenario, we consider the manufacturer as the leader and in the latter, we allow the distributer to act as the dominant member of the supply chain. In order to tackle bi-level programming models, a meta-heuristic genetic algorithm with hierarchical structure is developed for each scenario and optimal policies for the members in terms of pricing, advertising, inventory, and demand allocation are determined. Finally, several computational experiments are conducted on the data obtained from an automotive spare parts supply chain to demonstrate the validity of the developed models and compare the bene ts of members as well as of the entire system.

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“…Different cooperative advertising models have been studied more sufficiently in the forward supply chain (FSC) [22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31][32] including two excellent reviews [22,23]. On the other hand, advertising occupies a crucial position in promoting the quantity of collected used products [33].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Within the research of cooperative advertising composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, Yue et al [24] and Wei and Xie [28] investigated two game models including Stackelberg-manufacturer and cooperative game. Meanwhile, considering retailers' increasing power in supply chains, another two games, Stackelberg-retailer and equal power as in Nash game, were taken into account [26,27,29,31].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

2017

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Improper disposal of household unwanted medications (UMs) is an emergency problem around the world that adversely affects the sustainability of the environment and human's health. However, the current disposal practices, mainly based on advertising and collecting status, are unsatisfactory in most countries and regions. Thus, some scholars proposed an alternative disposal practice that is to provide incentives to customers. This study aims to compare a Single Model (advertising only) with a Joint Model (advertising with take-back pricing) in a two-echelon reverse supply chain (RSC) that is composed of one disposer and one collector. In each model, four games (non-cooperative, collector as the Stackelberg leader, disposer as the Stackelberg leader, and cooperative) were established in order to identify the optimal pricing and advertising strategies for both members. The results of the study indicate that there is a Pareto dominant range for Joint Model compared to Single Model, whereas Single Model has no Pareto improvement in any games. Furthermore, in non-cooperative games of Joint Model, it is better to implement the leader-follower structure rather than simultaneous movement structure. Additionally, it is verified that the cooperative game is feasible, which leads to the cooperation between the disposer and the collector, and the extra profit from the cooperation can be shared based on the Nash bargaining game. However, in Single Model, it is better for the disposer to act as a channel leader and the collector figures the follower.

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Coordination of cooperative advertising in a two-level supply chain when manufacturer offers discount

Cited by 248 publications

References 11 publications

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

Game Theoretic Analysis of Carbon Emission Abatement in Fashion Supply Chains Considering Vertical Incentives and Channel Structures

A bi-level programming model for decentralized manufacturer-distributer supply chain considering cooperative advertising

Game Theoretic Analysis of Pricing and Cooperative Advertising in a Reverse Supply Chain for Unwanted Medications in Households

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