Coordination of VMI supply chain with replenishment tactic under risk aversion and sales effort

Liu, Jing; Huang, Fuyou; Ma, Chao

doi:10.1007/s10288-020-00450-1

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 38 publications

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“…Under the carbon cap and trade mechanism, one logistics company uses fuel vehicle (FV) and the other uses EV in the distribution process. Expected utility (EU) [ 7 ], mean variance (MV) and conditional value at risk (CVaR) [ 8 ] are three common measures of risk aversion. Compared with EU and CVaR methods, MV has advantages in modeling risk aversion because it can transform random problems into deterministic approximate problems [ 9 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game

Huang,

Liu,

Tao

et al. 2023

PLoS ONE

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With the implementation of the double carbon plan, this paper considers the delivery fees of two risk averse logistics companies under carbon cap and trade mechanism. We establish logistics company Stackelberg (MS) model and retailer Stackelberg (RS) model under mean variance (MV) framework, respectively. We obtain the optimal delivery fees and retail prices. We find out that the higher degree of risk aversion can lead to a lower delivery fee. We also show that a higher carbon trading price or a higher cross price sensitivity will increase delivery fees. Moreover, we indicate that the performances of logistics companies under MS scenario are higher than that RS scenario. In addition, we suggest that under the carbon cap and trade rules, in order to obtain higher profits, logistics companies should use fuel vehicle for transportation under certain conditions, and use electric vehicle in other cases.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game

Huang,

Liu,

Tao

et al. 2023

PLoS ONE

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Low-carbon strategies in dual-channel supply chain under risk aversion

Zhao

et al. 2022

MBE

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<abstract><p>In a low-carbon supply chain (LCSC) constructed by a single manufacturer and a single retailer, three decision-making models are established by introducing channel preference attributes. That is, a single sales channel model, an online and offline dual channel model, and a dual channel model in which the manufacturer share revenue with her retailer. Using the mean variance (MV) method to characterize the risk aversion utility function of the manufacturer and the retailer, the following r are found. i) Consumers' preference for low-carbon products is conducive to raising the price of low-carbon products and the firms' profits. ii) The deepening of the retailer's risk aversion promotes the increase of the manufacturer's price, while the impact of the manufacturer's risk aversion has an opposite effects. Although the arbitrage behavior of the retailer can not be completely avoided in the risk aversion environment. However in a limited risk aversion environment, dual-channel development is conducive to increasing the profits of the manufacturer, but may harm the interests of the retailer. iii) Consumers' preference for online channel helps the manufacturer increase prices and profit. iv) The sharing of revenue by the manufacturer to the retailer is conducive to increasing the revenue of the retailer. Based on this, in order to improve corporate profits and promote long-term transactions, the manufacturer can carry out low-carbon promotion and implement a dual-channel strategy. The retailer can actively seek channel cooperation with the manufacturer.</p></abstract>

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Coordination of VMI supply chain with replenishment tactic under risk aversion and sales effort

Cited by 2 publications

References 38 publications

Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game

Pricing decisions of risk averse logistic companies with carbon cap and trade under Stackelberg game

Low-carbon strategies in dual-channel supply chain under risk aversion

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