Coordination strategies in a three-echelon reverse supply chain for economic and social benefit

Li, Jian; Wang, Zhen; Jiang, Bao; Kim, Taebok

doi:10.1016/j.apm.2017.04.031

Cited by 57 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Assumption Similar to Li et al. () and Wang et al. (), the customer supply function is influenced by the acquisition price of collector i and can be expressed as follows:

r_{i} false(u_{i} false) = r_{0} + b u_{i} .

…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Rahmani

Haeri

Hosseini‐Motlagh

2019

Int Trans Operational Res

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Considering and analyzing various kinds of cooperation among supply chain members is an option for better managing each channel. It is noteworthy that in many real‐world cases, each of vertical and horizontal cooperation has an important role in the success of supply chains. Nevertheless, only vertical cooperation in most previous research is considered. This paper addresses both vertical and horizontal cooperation in two competitive reverse supply chains, each of which includes one collector, one remanufacturer, and one retailer. Our primary concern is to analyze quality improvement competition between the remanufacturers. Moreover, retail price competition between the retailers and the quality competition are simultaneously considered in the extended model. In this research, the investigated system has been analyzed under different structures including decentralized, centralized, horizontal cooperation, and coordinated decision‐making models. The results show that when the remanufacturers cooperate horizontally, the profit of each collector and that of the retailer will decrease compared with those in the decentralized structure. To overcome this problem, a new coordination contract named multiple‐link two‐part tariff is proposed to simultaneously coordinate the members of each chain. The proposed contract effectively convinces the remanufacturers to participate in the coordination model instead of the horizontal cooperation. Moreover, it provides a win–win–win condition for all chain members and improves the quality level of the remanufactured products. The results indicate the proper performance of the proposed contract in improving the benefits of the competing chains, especially when there exists no intense competition between the remanufacturers (i.e., when the market sensitivity to the quality of the remanufactured products is low and consequently less effort is needed to increase the quality of the remanufactured products). Moreover, the proposed contract not only is able to simultaneously increase both remanufactured products demand and of end‐of‐life products supply but also involves both economic and environmental benefits.

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“…Assumption Similar to Li et al. () and Wang et al. (), the customer supply function is influenced by the acquisition price of collector i and can be expressed as follows:

r_{i} false(u_{i} false) = r_{0} + b u_{i} .

…”

Section: Problem Descriptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Rahmani

Haeri

Hosseini‐Motlagh

2019

Int Trans Operational Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The model considers global factors, multi-objectives, and uncertainties in a closed-loop supply chain network. Li et al [22] studied a three-level reverse supply chain consisting of recyclers, remanufacturers, and two fully information-sharing distributors. In the coordination strategy of different supply chain entities, four different coordination strategies were discussed and the optimal decisions of different models are compared and analyzed in detail.…”

Section: Sustainable Development and Closed-loop Supply Chain Managementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

Zhu

2019

Sustainability

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The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

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“…When the traditional suppliers started to collect used products, a dual-source supply system would immediately form and competition occurred between the new component suppliers and recycled component suppliers. us, the stronger supplier can gain more benefit by increasing the wholesale price, while the weaker one would inevitably lose profits [22]. Generally, when the recycling suppliers enter the market, they not only compete with the original suppliers but also count on them for new components.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual-Source Supply and Low-Carbon Concern

Gong

2020

Complexity

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Considering the impact of dual-source supply and low-carbon manufacturing on a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, this article constructs a CLSC model with two competitive dominant upstream suppliers and one following a downstream (re-)manufacturer, then coordinates supply chain through cost-sharing contract. Based on the industrial case in the area of power battery, we analyze the optimal strategies under competition, cooperation, and coordination structures separately and then investigate the influences of emission reduction effort and collection efficiency on supply chain performance. The results reveal that collection of used products can positively affect the (re-)manufacturer’s profit but has opposite impact on the new component supplier. Besides, recycling is beneficial to both low-carbon consumers’ utility and social welfare, but hurts the total profit of CLSC because of the high investment cost of collection. Therefore, the paper designs a cost-sharing contract, which is of applicability and efficiency for both economic and environmental development. Furthermore, it can also increase the profit of CLSC up to cooperation case and improve each member’s profit, eliminating double marginal effect and achieving supply chain coordination.

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Coordination strategies in a three-echelon reverse supply chain for economic and social benefit

Cited by 57 publications

References 28 publications

Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Proposing channel coordination and horizontal cooperation in two competitive three‐echelon reverse supply chains

Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

Coordination of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Dual-Source Supply and Low-Carbon Concern

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