Coreference and meaning

Pinillos, N. Ángel

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9543-y

Cited by 41 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…Campbell (1987) saw it as a relation that permits "trading on identity" between the correspondent expressions and Dickie & Rattan (2010) followed him on that. Here I shall use the tag "de jure co-reference" (henceforth, DJCR) following the likes of Neale 2005, Pinillos 2011, Recanati 2012, and Goodsell 2014 Intuitively, DJCR is the linguistic (and cognitive) phenomenon of representing something as the same. Fine (2007) introduces it by distinguishing cases in which something is represented as being the same -like when we say that the morning star is the evening star -and cases in which something is represented as the same -like when we say that the morning star is the morning star.…”

Section: Enthymematic Reasoning and Discriminativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents

Boccardi

2018

Manuscrito

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In this paper, I argue that a number of influential Millian responses to Frege's puzzle, which consist in denying that Frege's data apply to natural languages (and thinking), are not viable if logic is to play its role in legitimizing the logical appraisal of rational subjects. A notion of validity which does justice to the normativity of logic must make room for a distinction between valid inferences and enthymemes. I discuss the prospects of formal, relevant and manifest validity as candidates for a notion which complies with this desideratum. Their success, or failure is argued to hang on the viability of a semantical account of de jure co-reference, which is in tension with standard Millian tenets. I conclude that these Millian theories face the following dilemma: either accept that there is no notion of logical validity which makes logic normative for reasoning, thus jeopardizing our well entrenched practices of rational appraisal; or accept that de jure coreference is a real semantical relation.--

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Section: Enthymematic Reasoning and Discriminativitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents

Boccardi

2018

Manuscrito

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“…12 Actualmente hay una discusión sobre correferencia, y distinciones que se hacen sobre esta, para esclarecer temas semánticos, cognitivos y epistémicos. Confróntese, por ejemplo, Recanati (2012), Pinillos (2011) y Fine (2007. Confróntese también Evans (1982) y Donnellan (1978.…”

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¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein

Suárez-Rivero¹

2017

Principia

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Abstract. In this paper I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980 to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper "On sense and reference". I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not weaken this phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Frege's argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely mentalist phenomenon; third, the explanation supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.Keywords: Howard Wettstein; Frege's puzzle; cognitive value; philosophical semantics; cognitive science; cognitive significance. IntroducciónEn los artículos "Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?" (1986) y "Turning the Tables on Frege" ( 1989), Howard Wettstein responde a uno de los retos cognitivos, común-mente conocido como el fenómeno del valor cognitivo, al que se enfrenta Gottlob Frege en su artículo "On sense and reference" (1892), a saber:(FVC) ¿Cómo es posible que un hablante competente, que entiende dos oraciones verdaderas de la forma a = a y a = b, donde a y b comparten el mismo referentee. g., (1) Julian Assange es Julian Assange y (2) Julian Assange es Paul Assange -, puede tener una distinta actitud cognitiva, aceptando a = a pero dudando de a = b, considerando trivial a = a pero informativa a = b, y teniendo un comportamiento distinto en función de cuál de las dos oraciones acepte? 1 En su respuesta, Wettstein defiende tres ideas: la primera, que a la semántica filosófica no le ha de incumbir (FVC), como Frege lo propuso en su momento; que es a la epistemología, o a la ciencia cognitiva, a la que se le ha de pedir una respuesta de este.2 La segunda, que Frege genera equivocadamente una teoría semántica a partir de un fenómeno puramente mentalista. La tercera, que (FVC) no presenta enigma alguno, como Frege lo formuló en su momento, pues no hay ninguna propiedad semántica en los términos de a = a y a = b que indique al hablante correferencia alguna. La intensión de Wettstein con su respuesta es mostrar que los teóricos de la referencia directa no han de sentirse obligados a proporcionar una explicación a (FVC), Principia 20(3): 427-453 (2016).

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“…In this example, which I adapt from one by Angel Pinillos (2009Pinillos ( , 2011, three files are involved. The ‗Hesperus' and ‗Phosphorus' files are the files which (before learning the identity -when he was deliberating whether to investigate both Hesperus and Phosphorus or only one of them) the confused subject used to deploy in thinking about Venus.…”

Section: Indexed Filesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empty Singular Terms in the Mental File Framework

Récanati¹

2014

Empty Representations

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Coreference and meaning

Cited by 41 publications

References 30 publications

Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents

Frege’s Puzzle on the Santa Monica Beach De Jure Co-reference and the Logical Appraisal of Rational Agents

¿Está disuelto el puzzle de Frege? Tres objeciones a Howard Wettstein

Empty Singular Terms in the Mental File Framework

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