Frege's puzzling remarks on the beginning of On Sense and Reference challenge us to explain how true identity sentences of the form a = a can differ in cognitive value from sentences of the form a = b when they are made true by the same object's selfidentity. Some philosophers (e.g. Almog, Glezakos and Paganini) suggest that the puzzle cannot be set up in the context of natural

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This essay is an introduction to Time and Reality I, the first part of a special issue dedicated to the philosophy of time. Here I outline a number of new trends in philosophical theorizing about time, detailing how the various contributions fit into the picture. I argue that there has been a potentially misleading tendency to separate the debate over the passage of time from the debate over the reality of tense. This has obscured a number of interesting philosophical questions. One of the aims of this volume is to bring these two issues together, where they belong. I argue that many contributions to it go in the right direction. The contributions to this volume also establish uncharted philosophical junctures between Metaphysics, Aesthetics, Morality, and the Philosophy of Mind.

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The arena of the philosophy of time has been largely concerned with deciding whether tense distinctions reflect absolute metaphysical distinctions or not. After bringing the debate over the metaphysical status of instantaneous velocity to bear on the debate over the nature of temporal passage, I argue that we should further investigate whether aspectual distinctions reflect objective and absolute metaphysical distinctions too. I conclude that those who think that being realist about tense uniquely makes room for the idea that time passes should be realist about the progressive too.