2010
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1601502
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Corporate Cash Holdings and Political Connections

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

1
24
0
2

Year Published

2014
2014
2022
2022

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 19 publications
(27 citation statements)
references
References 16 publications
1
24
0
2
Order By: Relevance
“…One obvious reason is that political connections might be established through lobbying, which would likely be paid for through a corporation's stock of cash. For example, Hill, Fuller, Kelly, and Washam () use lobbying expenses as a measure of political connectedness and find that firms with greater lobbying expense held less cash. However, under the view that politically connected firms are likely to experience agency problems, Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Saffar () find that politically connected firms held more cash relative to less‐connected peer firms.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…One obvious reason is that political connections might be established through lobbying, which would likely be paid for through a corporation's stock of cash. For example, Hill, Fuller, Kelly, and Washam () use lobbying expenses as a measure of political connectedness and find that firms with greater lobbying expense held less cash. However, under the view that politically connected firms are likely to experience agency problems, Boubakri, El Ghoul, and Saffar () find that politically connected firms held more cash relative to less‐connected peer firms.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More specifically, connected firms are able to evade the high transaction costs and financial market uncertainties because of privileged treatment in the credit market. Effectively, these firms do not have an incentive to hoard liquid assets at similar levels to those firms lacking such relationships (Hill et al, 2014). Consequently, the demand for cash reserves becomes further weakened.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As shown by prior studies, connected firms benefit from easy access to finance and are more likely to be bailed out in the event of financial distress (Boubakri et al 2008;Faccio 2006;and Khwaja and Mian, 2005). They are, therefore, unlikely to hoard large cash as a precautionary or transactions motives 2 (Hill et al, 2014). However, from the agency perspective, connected firms are considered as poorly governed and subject to more severe agency problems (Chaney et al, 2011).…”
Section: Excess Cash and Political Connectionsmentioning
confidence: 97%