Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership

Chung, Kee H.; Zhang, Hao

doi:10.1017/s0022109010000682

Cited by 487 publications

(334 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…'Managerial signalling theory' mengatakan bahwa direktur memiliki lebih banyak informasi mengenai perusahaan daripada pemegang saham outsiders (Bebchuk dan Weisbach, 2010). Oleh karena itu, direktur lebih mungkin mengeksploitasi informasi orang dalam terhadap ketidakberuntungan pemegang saham outsiders (Demsetz dan Lahn, 1985), yang mana dapat mempunyai pengaruh negatif terhadap kinerja keuangan dan nilai perusahaan (Chung dan Zhang, 2011;Ntim, et al, 2012). Berdasarkan uraian diatas dapat dihipotesis sebagai berikut: H2: Kepemilikan saham oleh direktur berpengaruh positif (negatif) terhadap kinerja keuangan bank-bank yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2011-2014.…”

Section: Kajian Teoriunclassified

Pengaruh Ukuran Dewan, Kepemilikan Saham Oleh Direktur, Dan Jender Terhadap Kinerja Keuangan Perbankan

Mardiyati¹,

Murdayanti²

2017

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Abstrak: Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui apakah mekanisme tata kelola perusahaan, khususnya ukuran dewan direktur, kepemilikan saham oleh direktur, dan jender, berpengaruh terhadap kinerja keuangan perbankan di Indonesia. Pada penelitian ini, kami menggunakan sampel 16 bank (45 observasi) yang terdaftar di bursa efek Indonesia antara tahun 2011 dan 2014. Metode analisis yang digunakan ialah regresi fixed effects dan random effects. Dikontrol oleh variabel ukuran perusahaan, hutang, dan pertumbuhan perusahaan, hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan saham direktur berpengaruh signifikan kepada ROA dan Tobin's Q. Sedangkan jumlah dewan direktur dan keberadaan wanita dalam dewan direktur tidak berpengaruh. Kata Kunci: Ukuran dewan, kepemilikan direktur, jender, kinerjaAbstract: The objective of this study is to examine the effect of corporate governance mechanism, specifically board of directors, managerial ownership, and female director on banking performance in Indonesia. Sample of this research consists of 16 banking (45 observation) listed on Indonesia stock exchange (IDX) between 2011 and 2014. We employ fixed and random effect regressions to analyze research model. Controlling for firm size, leverage and firm growth (sales growth), the results show that managerial ownership significantly affects ROA and Tobin's Q. While board of director and female director do not.

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Section: Kajian Teoriunclassified

Pengaruh Ukuran Dewan, Kepemilikan Saham Oleh Direktur, Dan Jender Terhadap Kinerja Keuangan Perbankan

Mardiyati¹,

Murdayanti²

2017

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“…As a consequence, Chung and Zhang (2011) point that the level of corporate governance increases with the rise of financial institutions ownership, suggesting that good governance allow financial controlling shareholders to exert an active monitoring role over firms in order to ensure the return for their investment.…”

Section: Financial Institutions Ownershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Analysis of the Influence of Controlling Shareholder Identity over Earnings Informativeness on Brazilian Capital Market

Prazeres

Soeiro²,

Araújo³

et al. 2017

Enf.:Ref. Cont.

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This paper aimed to investigate the influence of controlling shareholder identity over earnings informativeness and to contribute empirically on the advance on the understanding of the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority investors through the lens of value relevance. The research sample considered 104 shares of non-financial firms negotiated on BM&FBovespa from 2011 to 2016. The methodology was conducted through panel data regression analysis. As results, this paper concludes with the following findings: i) the higher the control/vote power of controlling shareholder (ownership concentration) and the lower the stock liquidity, the less informative are the earnings and the greater is the probability of entrenchment and wealth expropriation by controlling shareholders; ii) larger firms and highly leveraged firms have more informative earnings; iii) the stock prices reflect the controlling shareholder identity; iv) Firms controlled by financial institutions, nonfinancial institutions and the government are much more likely to expropriate minority investors wealth and have less informative earnings; v) family firms are positively priced by the market. Uma análise da influência da identidade dos acionistas controladores sobre a informatividade dos lucros no mercado de capitais brasileiro RESUMOEste trabalho teve como objetivo investigar a influência da identidade dos acionistas sobre a informatividade dos lucros contribuindo empiricamente para uma melhor compreensão do conflito de agência entre acionistas controladores e investidores minoritários através da ótica do value relevance.A amostra da pesquisa considerou 104 ações de empresas não financeiras negociadas na BM&FBovespa de 2011 a 2016. A metodologia foi conduzida através da análise de dados de regressão em painel. Como resultado, este artigo conclui com as seguintes constatações: i) quanto maior o poder de controle / voto do acionista controlador (concentração de propriedade) e menor a liquidez das ações, menor é a informatividade dos lucros e maior é a probabilidade de entricheiramento e de expropriação de riqueza pelos acionistas controladores; ii) empresas maiores e com alto grau de endividamento têm lucros mais informativos; iii) os preços das ações refletem a identidade acionista controlador; iv) as empresas controladas por instituições financeiras, instituições não financeiras e pelo governo são muito mais propensas a expropriar riqueza investidores minoritários e têm lucros menos relevantes; v) as empresas familiares são precificadas de forma positiva pelo mercado.Palavras-chave: Conflito de Agência. Acionistas Controladores. Informatividade dos Lucros. Value Relevance.

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“…They examined institutional investors' portfolio holdings, and found that their investment decisions appear to be related to their revealed preferences. Chung and Zhang (2011) showed that the fraction of a company's shares held by institutional investors increase with the quality of its governance structure and the proportion of institutions holding a firm's shares increase with its governance quality. These results are consistent with the conjecture that institutional investors gravitate to stocks of companies with good governance structure to meet fiduciary responsibility as well as to minimise monitoring and exit costs.…”

Section: Ownership Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Study on theories and mechanisms of corporate governance

Mishra

Kapil

2017

IJAAPE

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This paper aims to review the theories of corporate governance for understanding the theoretical basis of corporate governance mechanisms. Major theoretical studies on corporate governance, including studies done in emerging economies, are included in the review. The paper looks at corporate governance theories from value creation point of view. It is observed that the two perspectives of corporate governance, i.e., shareholder and stakeholder perspectives, are not in contrast to each other but are pointing towards the same goal, i.e., value creation. However, one points towards value creation for shareholders and the other points towards creation of societal value. While reviewing theoretical underpinnings and assumptions for corporate governance perspectives, due consideration has been given to the development of corporate governance mechanism based on various existing theories. A theoretical framework for understanding the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and corporate performance has been proposed. Emerging challenges for corporate governance theories have also been indicated. This being a review paper, one of the major limitations is an unintentional omission of some literature because of non-availability or non-reachability. Literature that would have been present in languages other than English could also not been included in the review.

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Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership

Cited by 487 publications

References 62 publications

Pengaruh Ukuran Dewan, Kepemilikan Saham Oleh Direktur, Dan Jender Terhadap Kinerja Keuangan Perbankan

Pengaruh Ukuran Dewan, Kepemilikan Saham Oleh Direktur, Dan Jender Terhadap Kinerja Keuangan Perbankan

An Analysis of the Influence of Controlling Shareholder Identity over Earnings Informativeness on Brazilian Capital Market

Study on theories and mechanisms of corporate governance

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