2004
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.634521
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Corporate Governance and the Spinoff Decision

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Cited by 33 publications
(52 citation statements)
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References 37 publications
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“…In particular, diversification is positively related to managerial incentives, after controlling for firm-specific factors that influence diversification decisions. Ahn and Walker (2007) find that firms with more effective corporate governance are more likely to engage in spinoffs and become more focused.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…In particular, diversification is positively related to managerial incentives, after controlling for firm-specific factors that influence diversification decisions. Ahn and Walker (2007) find that firms with more effective corporate governance are more likely to engage in spinoffs and become more focused.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 90%
“…Many studies provide evidence that investment decisions of firms can be positively influenced by the level of CEO ownership (Lewellen et al, 1985(Lewellen et al, , 1989Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987;Morck et al, 1988;Hoechle et al, 2011). However, compensation may also reflect the CEO's bargaining power to extract more private benefits from the board and thus could be a signal of entrenchment (Ahn and Walker, 2007). Harford and Li (2007) document that CEO compensation schemes are not effective in controlling agency conflicts.…”
Section: Outside Director Ownershipmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some studies have focused on how governance shapes the actions of the CEO and top managers. For example, company ownership and boardroom structures, which represent a firm's governance style, have been used to help explain management's actions on corporate restructuring (e.g., Denis et al, 1997;Ahn and Walker, 2007;Netter et al, 2009;Bauguess et al, 2009), dividend decisions (Brav et al, 2005), and the pricing of executive stock options (Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003). Other examples include how governance has constrained managers' opportunistic uses of discretionary accruals in a firm's financial statements (Chung et al, 2002;Park and Shin, 2004), inter-group borrowings (Berkman et al, 2009), and corporate fraud (Chen et al, 2006).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%