Corporate governance influencing compliance with the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance

Exploring the association between the content of internal audit disclosures and external audit fees: Evidence from Sweden

“…The ownership variable ( OWN ) was measured by adding together the voting rights of the five largest shareholders. In a Swedish context, all shareholders have equal rights to the company's profit, though different classes of shares may have different voting rights (Tagesson & Collin, ). Voting rights were used as an ownership variable to capture the owner's ability to influence the governance of the company.…”

More than two decades after the Cadbury Report: How far has Sweden, as role model for corporate-governance practices, come?

“…As a third part of the corporate-governance framework, the Swedish Code stipulates a form of self-regulation with a focus on internal control, the board's responsibility for reporting, organizing and ensuring an independent audit function in the company (Svernlöv, 2005). The Code was first introduced in 2005 and updated four times since (in 2008, 2010, 2015, and 2016), aiming to achieve international harmonization through inclusion of EU recommendations, while adhering to Swedish legislation and Swedish legal and social traditions (SOU, 2004, p. 130;Tagesson and Collin, 2016).…”

“…The option of deviation from the Code can be seen both as an advantage and disadvantage. The advantage of this flexibility is that the Code can be adapted to the specific conditions prevailing in the industry or market in which the company operates and to the governance demands of its dominant stakeholders (Tagesson and Collin, 2016). The downside is that it could be used by CEOs and/or influential shareholders to implement a governance structure directed at maximizing their wealth and utility, rather than the utility of other principals (Tagesson and Collin, 2016).…”

“…Since its inception, similar codes regulating (listed) companies' corporate governance and their management have been introduced in many countries (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008;Seidl et al, 2013). These codes provide guidelines on how to deal with issues such as composition of boards, directors' remuneration and board independence (Hooghiemstra, 2012), reflecting the interests of international capital funds and other institutional investors (Tagesson and Collin, 2016;Thomsen, 2006): Academic scholars and policy-makers alike assume that investors' trust in the company's management is enhanced if relevant information about its corporate governance is disclosed (cf. von Werder et al, 2005).…”

Corporate governance reform and overstatement of compliance: Illustrations from an emerging economy

“…As a result, companies' institutional logics may determine alternatives to adoption, such as rejecting or modifying compliance rather than abiding by the codes. With respect to global CG practices, a growing body of research (e.g., Krenn, 2015;Tagesson & Collin, 2016) raises concern that CG regulations are being implemented in letter but not in spirit. Weber, Davis, andLounsbury (2009, p. 1327) observe, "it is also clear that practices resulting from coercive pressures are more likely to reflect ceremonial compliance because motivations, skills and resources for making the practices thrive do not become distributed in a local setting".…”