2017
DOI: 10.1080/14735970.2017.1365460
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Corporate illegal conduct and directors’ liability: an approach to personal accountability for violations of corporate legal compliance

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Cited by 7 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…By extension, it discusses how far the actions of individuals can be attributed to corporations. As Gobert and Punch (2003: 26) assert, individuals should not be made scapegoats for corporate failures, but neither should corporations become scapegoats for an individual's derelictions -albeit this point of culpability is more complex when such individuals are decision-makers such as directors (Nietsch 2017).…”
Section: Framing Corporate Crime and Harmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…By extension, it discusses how far the actions of individuals can be attributed to corporations. As Gobert and Punch (2003: 26) assert, individuals should not be made scapegoats for corporate failures, but neither should corporations become scapegoats for an individual's derelictions -albeit this point of culpability is more complex when such individuals are decision-makers such as directors (Nietsch 2017).…”
Section: Framing Corporate Crime and Harmmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In recent years, there has been increased interest in the influence of technology on compliance (Barboza et al, 2014). There has also been the investigation of compliance within economic contexts, with a particular focus on corporations and their violations of applicable law (Nietsch, 2018;Salguero-Caparrós, Pardo-Ferreira, Martínez-Rojas, & Rubio-Romero, 2020;Zinner, 2014); it has been argued that companies tend to have difficulty avoiding noncompliance and violation as legal obligations are deemed detrimental to companies' survivability (Salguero-Caparrós et al, 2020). In Indonesia, studies of compliance have often dealt with traffic, as well as the widespread violation of traffic laws (Agus, et al, 2016;Safitri & Rahman, 2013).…”
Section: Compliance With Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Another important development in the expansion of duties of director’s occurred in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation (1996) which imposed an additional element “duty to oversight” in “duty to care.” The Caremark doctrine was retained in the Marchand v. Barnhill (2019) and held that, directors owe the fiduciary duty of loyalty and breached duty by not making “a good faith effort to oversee the company’s operations.” Moreover, the Caremark set, for a board’s oversight obligation, only a “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to [personal] liability [of directors].” Hence, the duty of oversight is attached to “attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system which board concludes is adequate and exists.” Accordingly, failure to do so would render a director liable for damages done due to noncompliance (Nietsch, 2018).…”
Section: Liability Analysis For Anti-money Laundering Violationsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hence, the duty of oversight is attached to "attempt in good faith to assure that a corporate information and reporting system which board concludes is adequate and exists." Accordingly, failure to do so would render a director liable for damages done due to noncompliance (Nietsch, 2018).…”
Section: Liability Drift From Corporate To Individualsmentioning
confidence: 99%
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