2020
DOI: 10.1108/mf-05-2020-0278
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Corporate risk: CEO overconfidence and incentive compensation

Abstract: PurposeThe purpose of this study is to investigate the association between corporate risk and the interaction between CEO incentive compensation and CEO overconfidence.Design/methodology/approachThis empirical study performs random and fixed effect (FE) regression analysis. It uses option-implied measures of CEO overconfidence.FindingsThe authors contribute to the existing literature by showing (1) that the positive association between high CEO incentive compensation and corporate risk only exists in the spher… Show more

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Cited by 14 publications
(12 citation statements)
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References 87 publications
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“…In line with previous discussion, our findings also show that the negative relation between TMT gender diversity and firm risk diminishes with the presence of incentive pay. Hence, this result further corroborates the prior research, which attested incentive compensations as mitigating the risk aversion in corporate decisions (Aabo et al , 2021; Shue and Townsend, 2017). This significant finding for the impact of incentive pay on firm risk could be explained by the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which asserts that firms need to implement certain mechanisms to deal with the problems because of the separation of ownership and management.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 90%
“…In line with previous discussion, our findings also show that the negative relation between TMT gender diversity and firm risk diminishes with the presence of incentive pay. Hence, this result further corroborates the prior research, which attested incentive compensations as mitigating the risk aversion in corporate decisions (Aabo et al , 2021; Shue and Townsend, 2017). This significant finding for the impact of incentive pay on firm risk could be explained by the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which asserts that firms need to implement certain mechanisms to deal with the problems because of the separation of ownership and management.…”
Section: Discussionsupporting
confidence: 90%
“…Overconfident executives are likely to underestimate the necessity or ability of stakeholders to provide resources, and thus neglect to exchange benefits with their stakeholders through carbon information disclosure to facilitate the further development of the firm. Overconfident executives may also overestimate the total amount of potential resources owned by the firm, overestimate their own ability to deal with the problem of insufficient firm resources (Aabo et al, 2021). Overconfident executives believe that they can control the development of things, so when making decisions, they tend to adopt more risky and aggressive methods, and the level of risk taking of their firms will be higher (Schumacher et al, 2020).…”
Section: Executive Overconfidence and The Quality Of Carbon Information Disclosurementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lee et al (2019) study the operations and management of a bank and show during the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009 that there is a significant impact on a bank’s systemic risk when a CEO is overconfident. Aabo et al (2020) look at corporate risk through a CEO’s overconfidence and incentive compensation and conclude that a CEO’s overconfidence and high CEO incentive compensation will cause corporate risk to increase. Banerjee et al (2020) analyze the relationships among governance, board inattention, and the appointment of overconfident CEOs and suggest that governance and board play a role to avoid a CEO’s confident tendency from becoming greater risk-taking.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%