Correlated equilibria in competitive staff selection problem

Ramsey, David; Szajowski, Krzysztof

doi:10.4064/bc71-0-21

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2006

2009

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“…It is interesting to note that Ramsey and Szajowski (2006) applied the Baston and Garnaev game as an illustrative example in their extension of the concept of correlated strategies to Markov stopping games where the situation of multiple solutions may arise.…”

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confidence: 99%

A game-theoretical model of competition for staff between two departments

Garnaev

2006

Game Theory and Mathematical Economics

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The main purpose of this paper is to analyze a development of a scenario suggested by Baston and Garnaev (2005) for modelling the situation where two departments in a large organization are each seeking to make an appointment within the same area of expertise, for instance, a computer science specialist. The departments are interested in three skills of the candidate (say, writing code, communication and in algorithms). In our scenario Department 1 wants to employ a candidate with excellent skills in writing code and communication. Department 2 is looking for a candidate with excellent skills in developing algorithms and communication. So, the departments have a joint interest, as well as their own interest. The scenario is modelled by a multistage non-zero sum game. Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg strategies are derived.

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confidence: 99%