2007
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.992399
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Corruption and Bilateral Trade Flows: Extortion or Evasion?

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Cited by 59 publications
(88 citation statements)
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References 46 publications
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“…This conclusion is based on the fact that the interaction terms are almost identical with the trade regulation variable (with single correlation coefficients of approximately 0.99). This is true for both of the interaction terms identified by Dutt and Traca (2010), and we can thereby provide no evidence confirming their results. Instead, these interaction terms are excluded from the estimations because of their high correlation with the importing country's applied ad valorem tariff equivalent.…”
contrasting
confidence: 71%
See 3 more Smart Citations
“…This conclusion is based on the fact that the interaction terms are almost identical with the trade regulation variable (with single correlation coefficients of approximately 0.99). This is true for both of the interaction terms identified by Dutt and Traca (2010), and we can thereby provide no evidence confirming their results. Instead, these interaction terms are excluded from the estimations because of their high correlation with the importing country's applied ad valorem tariff equivalent.…”
contrasting
confidence: 71%
“…Customs officials who use their power to collect bribes may create an opportunity to avoid the enforcement of trade regulation, which can enhance trade compared to uncorrupt customs processing. Dutt and Traca (2010) show that this trade-enhancing effect can prevail when tariffs are high and provide evidence that it can be found in a small share of their trade observations. This non-linear effect is taken into account in our empirical investigation.…”
Section: The Corruption Impact On International Economic Exchangementioning
confidence: 77%
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“…Weapon makers in corrupt countries export to areas of civil conflicts despite arms embargoes (DellaVigna and La Ferrara 2010). More generally, Dutt and Traca (2010) show that when tariffs are high, bribes grease the wheels of commerce.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%