Corruption and Cooperation

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Corruption is a widespread phenomenon. Nevertheless, causal evidence on the effects of corruption is still lacking. In this paper, we assess whether and how corruption affects cooperation using a public good game experiment. Overall, contributions to the public good are reduced by 30% when participants have the possibility to bribe the punishment authority. Two concurrent channels lead to lower levels of cooperation. First, the punishment of low contributors decreases both at the intensive and the extensive margin. Second, bribery discourages initially high contributors, who gradually decrease their contributions down to the level of initially low contributors. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayJEL CODES: C91, D73, K42

Creating an Efficient Culture of Cooperation

“…Recent papers (Buffat & Senn, 2017;Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi, & Henrich, 2017) have pointed out that those who punish under centralized punishment may be subject to the temptations of corruption, which then induces dysfunctional sanctioning patterns. Institutional competition via voting with the feet mechanisms, normative consensus building, and the election of judges may also prove to be important in combatting the corruption of leaders and judges in centralized sanctioning systems.…”

The Weak State Trap

“…Indeed, a law‐abiding citizen may be discouraged from obeying the law if he observes that others instead take advantage of it. Consistent with these ideas, Buffat and Senn (2017) show that cooperation in a public good game falls in the presence of corruption (in the form of bribes to the punishment authority). Similarly, in a field experiment, Beekman et al .…”

Social Norms, Endogenous Sorting and the Culture of Cooperation

“…Our results raise, of course, also many new questions that could be pursued by future research. Recent papers (Buffat & Senn, 2017;Muthukrishna, Francois, Pourahmadi, & Henrich, 2017) have pointed out that those who punish under centralized punishment may be subject to the temptations of corruption, which then induces dysfunctional sanctioning patterns. Institutional competition via voting with the feet mechanisms, normative consensus building, and the election of judges may also prove to be important in combatting the corruption of leaders and judges in centralized sanctioning systems.…”