2007
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.11.005
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Corruption and inefficiency: Theory and evidence from electric utilities

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Cited by 240 publications
(108 citation statements)
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“…Bribery can also cause longer delays in public services provision, and thereby project interruptions, if bureaucrats tend to increase red tape in order to extract more bribes (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000). Finally, higher bribes can provoke reallocation of talent from production to rent-seeking (Murphy et al, 1991, Dal Bo andRossi, 2007). In this case, one would expect a negative relationship between bribery mean and firm performance.…”
Section: Local Bribery Environments and Firm Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bribery can also cause longer delays in public services provision, and thereby project interruptions, if bureaucrats tend to increase red tape in order to extract more bribes (Kaufmann and Wei, 2000). Finally, higher bribes can provoke reallocation of talent from production to rent-seeking (Murphy et al, 1991, Dal Bo andRossi, 2007). In this case, one would expect a negative relationship between bribery mean and firm performance.…”
Section: Local Bribery Environments and Firm Performancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Reform in the telecom sector has been perceived as less politically risky than reform of the power sector. 30 Technological progress in telecom created new avenues for competition between fixed and mobile services, which offer consumers different options. However, in the power sector, self-generation is not an option for most users.…”
Section: Oversight and Regulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Subsidies and price regulations may benefit consumers if required to strengthen support among the 29 The opposite may also hold, according to Murillo and Martinez-Gallardo (2007). 30 Candeub, Cunningham, and Alexander (2008), for example, find that non-democratic regimes with relatively low protection of property rights may well experience mobile network growth, as long as some minimum regulations are in place regarding tariffs, import controls and level of foreign ownership restrictions. 31 See Adenikinju (2005) for a case study of how political dominance in regulation may challenge electricity provision under "club leadership."…”
Section: Pricing and Subsidiesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The degree of corruption could be another governance attribute impacting on electricity outcomes. Dal Bó and Rossi [19] find that more corruption in a country is associated with lower efficiency in electric utility firms in a sample of Latin American countries. Estache et al [20] also find that corruption has negative impacts for the electricity sector.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 96%