Corruption and Legislatures

Abstract

The control of corruption is an important element of governance and a stated goal of many governments. Legislative oversight is an acknowledged mechanism for controlling corruption, but little research has been undertaken on this subject, and national anticorruption strategies generally ignore the legislature. This article addresses the question of whether legislative oversight helps to curb perceived corruption, and if so, how. Statistical analysis using data from a global survey of 82 legislatures found that the presence of legislative oversight tools explains a major proportion of the variance in perceived levels of wrongdoing in countries with presidential forms of government, but much less in countries with semipresidential governments and less yet again in parliamentary systems. The analysis also found that the effectiveness of legislative oversight instruments varies by form of government. In presidential countries the most important instruments are committee hearings, hearings in plenary, and ombuds offices; in semipresidential countries they are question time, interpellations, and ombuds, while in parliamentary systems interpellations are the most important. These findings demonstrate that while the oversight apparatus is useful in helping curb malfeasance, not all tools are equally effective, and what works for some forms of government may not work as well, or at all, in other systems. Clearly, the "one size fits all" approach is inadequate when it comes to legislative corruption control.

Confronting the Monolith: Insider Accounts of the Nature and Techniques of Corruption in Nigeria

“…Bureaucratic corruption is sometimes referred to as a ‘way of life’ because it has become a routine and generally accepted behavior by the society. Thus, at petty level, the one that most directly affects the aggrieved public is corruption involving countless underpaid or greedy public servants who overcharge the public for services such as granting of driver’s licenses, passports, and business permits (Stapenhurst, & Sedigh, 1999).…”

Bringing the Legislature Back In: Examining the Structural Effects of National Legislatures on Effective Democratic Governance

“…Increasing the breadth and scope of oversight mechanisms within legislatures can decrease opportunistic behaviour among politicians and improve governance (Kaufmann and Dininio 2006). Using a global survey employed in 82 national legislatures, Stapenhurst et al (2014) operationalize legislative oversight based on parliamentary tools that can scrutinize the behaviour of governmental activities, including the presence of 'ombudsmen, auditing institutions, specialized parliamentary committees, public hearings, and interpellations that may end with a vote in the chamber' (Stapenhurst et al 2014: 290). Based on their empirical analysis, legislatures that have more oversight functions are correlated to lower levels of perceived state corruption based on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index using 2012 data, although the relationship is marginally significant at (p < 0.10) and does not control for levels of economic development and regime type.…”

A Modest Defense of Politically Engaged Best Practices: The Case of Legislative Strengthening

“…A politically engaged best practice seeks to link the tools with the political will to bring that process to life, though much still depends on the amount of time and resources available to the project. LS can draw on best practice while, at the same time, recognizing variations in local context as has recently been explored in the context of legislative oversight tools to combat corruption (Stapenhurst, Jacobs, and Pelizzo ).…”