Corruption and Policy: Back to the Roots

Broadman, Harry G.; Recanatini, Francesca

doi:10.1080/13841280212381

Cited by 27 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Thus, the impact of corruption on firms appears to increase with their income, because bureaucrats extorting bribes discriminate between high-and low-productivity agents. Along these lines, Broadman and Recanatini (2002), Djankov et al (2002) and Svensson (2005) find a strong correlation between higher barriers to market entry and the level of corruption.…”

Section: The Environmentmentioning

confidence: 92%

The Role of Income Uncertainty in the Corruption–Growth Nexus

Dzhumashev

2016

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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This paper analyses how corruption-induced income uncertainty affects the relationship between corruption and economic growth. The analysis reveals both the growth-enhancing and deteriorating effects of corruption that transmit through the income and productivity channels, and shows how income uncertainty caused by corruption interacts with both of these effects. In particular, it is found that an increase in bribe rates and the probability of corruption that reduces the burden of regulations generate counteracting effects on income and productivity, where both effects are further aggravated by corruption-induced income uncertainty. On the other hand, a higher burden of bribes imposed by extortive bureaucrats hampers growth unambiguously. However, in a highly corrupt environment, an increase in the incidence of extortive behaviour can be growth enhancing as it reduces income uncertainty, while if corruption levels are relatively low, then a further increase in the incidence of such behaviour deteriorates growth. These findings give us a new insight into why the overall growth effect of corruption is ambiguous.

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Section: The Environmentmentioning

confidence: 92%

The Role of Income Uncertainty in the Corruption–Growth Nexus

Dzhumashev

2016

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis &Amp; Policy

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“…In a study of transition economies, Broadman and Recanatini (2002) find the same broad economic and political causalities as do most global cross-country studies (e.g. Djankov et al, 2006), i.e.…”

Section: Socio-political and Economic Elements Of Intentionalitymentioning

confidence: 97%

Government Bureaucracy, Transactional Impediments, and Entrepreneurial Intentions

Griffiths

Kickul²,

Carsrud

2009

International Small Business Journal: Researching Entrepreneurs

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In environments where information asymmetries and changing market conditions are ever-present, discerning between different macro-level and contextual factors that stimulate or inhibit entrepreneurial activity still needs to be validated. Utilizing our own primary data (N = 1473 across 10 countries) as well as secondary data (World Bank Economic Forum, Global Financial Data, and Transparency International), we investigate the role that several contextual indices (e.g. perceptions of an entrepreneurial culture) and macro-level indices (e.g. government corruption, GDP per capita, and ease of doing business indices) have on entrepreneurial intentions. Results reveal the impact government corruption and the concomitant transactional impediments have on the degree of entrepreneurial interest across countries.

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“…Largely using aggregate indices of competitiveness, there is empirical support in the literature that greater competitiveness reduces corruption (Goel and Nelson 2005; also see Scully and Slottje 1991). More specifically, research focusing on the effects of regulation on corruption has largely focused on business startup regulation (Broadman and Recanatini 2002, Djankov et al 2002, Svensson, 2005, Jing and Graham, 2008.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Business regulation and taxation: effects on cross-country corruption

Goel

2012

Journal of Economic Policy Reform

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This paper adds to the literature on the government-corruption nexus by examining the effects of taxation and various business regulations on cross-country corruption. Regulations considered include the number of procedures and related costs for business startup, licensing and property registrations. Results show that regulation, not taxation, generally positively impacts corruption and the effects of non-monetary regulatory costs are more significant than monetary costs. Findings are generally robust to an alternate corruption measure and to simultaneity between corruption and regulation. Results for 'standard' determinants of corruption largely support the literature. Policy implications are discussed.

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Corruption and Policy: Back to the Roots

Cited by 27 publications

References 9 publications

The Role of Income Uncertainty in the Corruption–Growth Nexus

The Role of Income Uncertainty in the Corruption–Growth Nexus

Government Bureaucracy, Transactional Impediments, and Entrepreneurial Intentions

Business regulation and taxation: effects on cross-country corruption

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