Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization

Banfield, Edward C.

doi:10.1007/978-1-4613-2481-2_8

Cited by 132 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…One common argument is that there is a clear division between the public and private spheres (Lennerfors 2009;Williams 1999) and that corruption happens only in government institutions that constitute a "foreign body within the market sphere" (Van Klaveren 1989, 25). The extension of government and its authority into the economic sphere distorts the functioning of the market and creates new incentives for corrupt public officers and opportunities for rent seeking private firms (Acemoglu and Verdier 2000;Banfield 1975;Krueger 1974;Tanzi and Davoodi 1997;Treisman 2000;Tullock 1996).…”

Section: Corruption As Utility Maximization: a Rational-actor Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption

Jancsics

2014

Sociology Compass

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Corruption has become one of the most popular topics in the social scientific disciplines. However, there is a lack of interdisciplinary communication about corruption. Models developed by different academic disciplines are often isolated from each other. The purpose of this paper is to review several major approaches to corruption and draw them closer to each other. Most studies of corruption fall into three major categories: (i) rational‐actor models where corruption is viewed as resulting from cost/benefit analysis of individual actors; (ii) structural models that focus on external forces that determine corruption; and (iii) relational models that emphasize social interactions and networks among corrupt actors. Focusing on actors' behavior and the social context, this article explains corruption concepts taken from sociology, economics, organization studies, political science, social anthropology, and social psychology.

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Section: Corruption As Utility Maximization: a Rational-actor Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption

Jancsics

2014

Sociology Compass

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“…Using agency theory terminology, citizens are the principals and rulers are their agents. Many papers on corruption are based on this approach; for example, Banfield (1975), Klitgaard (1988), Rose-Ackerman (1975, 1978. 9.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption: the corporate perspective

Argandoña

2001

Business Ethics: A European Review

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Corruption (bribery, extortion, blackmail, favor‐currying, abuse of insider information, nepotism, favoritism, mafias, protection rackets, siphoning off funds, laundering illicit money) is a source of concern for governments, entrepreneurs, private individuals, non‐governmental organizations, companies – indeed, for society as a whole, on a number of levels; economic, sociopolitical, and ethical. The purpose of this article is primarily to explain why corruption is a cause for concern for companies. It begins by explaining what corruption is, describing how it occurs and offering a causal explanation, and then goes on to describe how it occurs in companies and why it is a cause of concern for them.

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“…Goal ambiguity, multiplicity, confl ict (Banfi eld 1976;Gawthrop 1971;Rainey 1983Rainey , 1993Seidman 1970;Weiss 1974) No direct corollary for this group in our court decisions. No state action cases expressly address these factors in attributing action to the state.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Acts can be coerced, monopolistic, or unavoidable (Banfi eld 1976;Caiden 1971;Lowi 1969;Meyer 1972;Stahl 1971;Weidenbaum 1969) 6 Strategic decision-making processes subject to stimuli, interruptions, constrained (Appleby 1945;Charlesworth 1968;Dahl and Lindblom 1953;Mainzer 1973;Mintzberg 1973) 7 Administrative authority constrained by law (Buchanan 1975;Gawthrop 1971;Golembiewski 1969;Siffi n 1963) 8 Involved in production of public goods (Burkhead and Miner 1971;Hinrichs and Taylor 1972) Courts use the term "government function" to distinguish relevant cases but have considered very few functions to be "traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state" (Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.). 9…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Public–Private Distinction: Insights for Public Administration from the State Action Doctrine

Malatesta

Carboni

2014

Public Administration Review

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Public administration scholars continue to grapple with how and why public organizations diff er from private organizations. Th e judiciary deals with similar questions in ruling on constitutional claims that apply exclusively to state actors. Th e authors consider similarities and diff erences between scholarly and judicial approaches, adding to the body of research attempting to capture the complexities of the public-private distinction. Th e application in this article includes the coding of seminal court decisions and qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to fi nd combinations of causal conditions that lead to state action rulings. Th e specifi cs revealed through QCA provide valuable lessons for extending public norms and preserving constitutional protections when outsourcing public services. Practitioner Points• Public managers continue to grapple with distinguishing "public" from "private." Meanwhile the courts apply the State Action Doctrine to distinguish state actors from private actors in order to determine the boundaries for constitutional protections. • Public administrators should be knowledgable about the State Action Doctrine; its application has critical implications for contracting and the extension of constitutional protections. • When public managers outsource services to private actors they can craft contract language to guarantee constitutional protections, thereby fi lling any constitutional voids that may result from defi ning an actor as "private."

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Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization

Cited by 132 publications

References 2 publications

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Corruption

Corruption: the corporate perspective

The Public–Private Distinction: Insights for Public Administration from the State Action Doctrine

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