Cost-Saving Production Technologies and Strategic Delegation*

Bárcena‐Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Olaizola, Norma

doi:10.1111/j.1467-8454.2006.00283.x

Cited by 17 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Similarly, we anticipate an outsider effect (Salant et al, ) when POs do not involve any synergies. Thirdly, the link between participations and technological investment is also significant (see, e.g., Barcena‐Ruiz & Olaizola, ; Minetti, Murro, & Zhu, ).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Takeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: The case of golden shares

Serbera

Fry

2019

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyse takeovers in an industry with bilateral capital‐linked firms in cross partial ownership (CPO). Before merger, CPO reduces the profitability of involved firms, confirming the “outsider effect.” However, the impact of CPO upon merger profitability is two‐sided in a Cournot setting. CPO, by cointegrating profits, increases output collusion leading to anticompetitive effects with facilitated mergers in most cases. Nonetheless, a protective threshold exists for which CPO arrangements can reduce the incentives for hostile takeovers. This has potentially significant regulatory implications. An illustrative example showcases the potential relevance of CPO as a defence against hostile takeovers across different industries.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Takeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: The case of golden shares

Serbera

Fry

2019

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Hoernig () and Chirco and Scrimitore () study the impact of network effects in a duopoly. Amir and Wooders () and Barcena‐Ruiz and Olaizola () investigate firms’ R&D investments under imperfect competition. Wang and Wang () study vertically related markets.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capturing Direct and Cross Price Effects in a Differentiated Products Duopoly Model

Kopel

Ressi

Lambertini

2016

The Manchester School

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We show that a frequently used direct demand system with product differentiation in a duopoly market generates unexpected effects of increasing the substitutability of firms’ products on prices, outputs, profits and welfare. Using the original demand system introduced by Bowley (The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1924) as a reference, we argue that this alternative model does not capture a consumer's taste for variety. Moreover, we demonstrate that positive values for the parameter which represents cross‐price effects in the alternative demand system corresponds to the regime of complementary products in the original Bowley model. As a consequence, for increasing values of this parameter—meant to capture increasing competition in the usual sense—prices do not converge towards marginal costs and profits do not vanish. Finally, we study a duopoly with international transfer pricing and demonstrate that conflicting policy conclusions are derived depending on which of the models is used to capture demand.

show abstract

“…Researches on the cross-ownership: A larger number of studies show that crossownership is widespread in some industries especially in enterprises that have specifi c investment relationship (Alley, 1997;Barcena-Ruiz & Olaizola, 2007). The causes mainly include: avoiding deviations caused by management deviations and promoting cooperation and mutual supervision among group enterprise; preventing hostile takeover to maintain the survival of enterprises; obtaining special knowledge to achieve synergies and diversifi ed investment by equity holding; strengthening the cooperation of upstream and downstream enterprise to promote production effi ciency (Manasakis, & Vlassis, 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Duopoly, Optimal Proportion of State-Owned Shares and International Cross-Ownership

Chen¹,

Tang²,

Liu³

2019

RCIS

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper constructs a duopoly model to study the optimal international cross-ownership and state-owned shares proportion when domestic state-owned enterprise competes with foreign-funded enterprise in home market or against local enterprise in foreign market under Cournot competition. The results indicate that whether to implement international cross-ownership or not and the proportion of state-owned depend on the implementing subject of cross-ownership, competitive environment, the efficiencies of state-owned and private capitals, and so on. The proportion of state-owned shares may influence the action of international cross-ownership in some cases. Complete nationalization is optimal choice under specified condition. These conclusions have certain significance for the formulation of privatization policies in various countries and the merger and reorganization of enterprises in the international scope.

show abstract

Cost-Saving Production Technologies and Strategic Delegation*

Cited by 17 publications

References 12 publications

Takeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: The case of golden shares

Takeover deterrents and cross partial ownership: The case of golden shares

Capturing Direct and Cross Price Effects in a Differentiated Products Duopoly Model

Duopoly, Optimal Proportion of State-Owned Shares and International Cross-Ownership

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About