Duopoly, Optimal Proportion of State-Owned Shares and International Cross-Ownership

Chen, Junlong; Tang, Hao; Liu, Jiali

doi:10.33788/rcis.64.26

Cited by 8 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…If only one firm adopts CSR, the utility functions of two enterprises are U 1 = π 1 + βCS and U 2 = π 2 . Social welfare is defined as SW = π 1 + π 2 + CS (Chen, Wang, &Chu, 2020), where

italicCS = \frac{{q_{1}}^{2} + {q_{2}}^{2} + 2 q_{1} q_{2}}{2}

(Chen, Liu, Mo, & Xu, 2019; Chen, Tang, & Liu, 2019; Chen, Wang, Gao, & Long, 2019).…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The optimal level of corporate social responsibility based on the duopoly model

et al. 2020

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This paper constructs a duopoly model considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) and market's sensitivity to CSR (e) and analyzes the equilibrium results, the condition of CSR implementation and the optimal CSR level (β *) of Model CC (two enterprises implement CSR) and Model CN (only one enterprise implements CSR). The results show that β * is affected by competitors and e. e, marginal cost (c) and cost difference affect the equilibrium results and the comparative results. Reducing c and improving e can promote social welfare. Consumer surplus under Model CC is highest. CSR has a negative effect on social welfare under certain conditions.

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“…If only one firm adopts CSR, the utility functions of two enterprises are U 1 = π 1 + βCS and U 2 = π 2 . Social welfare is defined as SW = π 1 + π 2 + CS (Chen, Wang, &Chu, 2020), where

italicCS = \frac{{q_{1}}^{2} + {q_{2}}^{2} + 2 q_{1} q_{2}}{2}

(Chen, Liu, Mo, & Xu, 2019; Chen, Tang, & Liu, 2019; Chen, Wang, Gao, & Long, 2019).…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The optimal level of corporate social responsibility based on the duopoly model

et al. 2020

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“…The profit of each downstream enterprise can be described as = ( − ) , where = , . Assumption 3 The social welfare of the upstream industry is assumed to be = + (Chen, Tang & Liu, 2019;Chen, Liu, Long & Luo, 2019), where = 1 + 2 and =…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capacity Choice and Government Regulation in a Vertical Industry

Chen

Wang

Liu

2020

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This paper sets up an industry competition model consisting of two upstream enterprises and two downstream enterprises. Then we rely on the model to explore how non-regulation and different regulatory policies (maximizing the total profits of the upstream enterprises, the social welfare of the upstream industry or the overall social welfare) affect the following factors: the excess capacity, enterprise profits, consumer surpluses, social welfare in the upstream and downstream enterprises and the overall social welfare. The following conclusions are drawn from our research. First, whether and how the government regulates the capacity choice greatly affect the equilibrium outcomes, as well as the welfare distribution among the upstream enterprises, downstream enterprises, and consumers. The specific effects are dependent on market demand and enterprise cost. Second, the government should formulate its regulatory policies on capacity choice based on the overall social welfare of the entire supply chain. If the government aims to maximize the profits of the upstream enterprises, the social welfare of the downstream industry will be negatively affected. Third, excess capacity does not necessarily suppress social welfare. Under certain conditions, the worst scenario of excess capacity may occur under the pursuit of the maximal overall social welfare. Excess capacity may arise from various causes, rather than market competition or government regulation alone. Excess capacity cannot be attributed solely to government failure. These conclusions have some significance for optimizing capacity regulation policies.

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“…The social welfare of the supply chain consists of the profits of the upstream and downstream enterprises and the consumer surplus in the downstream, that is, sw = π U + π D 1 + π D 2 + cs (Chen, Tang, & Liu, ; Chen, Wang, Gao, & Long, ). Inspired by Singh and Vives (), Hackner (), and Fanti (), the consumer surplus is assumed to be

italiccs = U ((),, q_{1}, q_{2}) - p_{1} q_{1} - p_{2} q_{2} = \frac{q_{1}^{2} + q_{2}^{2} + 2 r q_{1} q_{2}}{2}

.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The supplier's profits can be expressed as π U = c 1 q 1 +c 2 q 2 − c U . We define the supplier's costs as The social welfare of the supply chain consists of the profits of the upstream and downstream enterprises and the consumer surplus in the downstream, that is, sw = π U +π D1 +π D2 +cs (Chen, Tang, & Liu, 2019;Chen, Wang, Gao, & Long, 2019). Inspired by Singh and Vives (1984), Hackner (2000), and Fanti (2016), the consumer surplus is…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Capacity sharing with different oligopolistic competition and government regulation in a supply chain

2019

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This paper constructs a capacity sharing model in a supply chain to reveal the factors affecting equilibrium outcomes. The results show that improving the technical level lowers capacity charge and increases seller profits in any case. Product differentiation has uncertain impacts on equilibrium outcomes, which depend on government regulations and oligopolistic competition models. The improvement of supplier's fixed component of marginal costs improves capacity sharing charge and reduces profits and consumer surplus. The government regulations and oligopolistic competition model directly affect equilibrium outcomes and welfare distribution. Government capacity control helps improve social welfare, but the effect of government subsidies is uncertain.

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Duopoly, Optimal Proportion of State-Owned Shares and International Cross-Ownership

Cited by 8 publications

References 15 publications

The optimal level of corporate social responsibility based on the duopoly model

The optimal level of corporate social responsibility based on the duopoly model

Capacity Choice and Government Regulation in a Vertical Industry

Capacity sharing with different oligopolistic competition and government regulation in a supply chain

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