This paper constructs a duopoly model considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) and market's sensitivity to CSR (e) and analyzes the equilibrium results, the condition of CSR implementation and the optimal CSR level (β *) of Model CC (two enterprises implement CSR) and Model CN (only one enterprise implements CSR). The results show that β * is affected by competitors and e. e, marginal cost (c) and cost difference affect the equilibrium results and the comparative results. Reducing c and improving e can promote social welfare. Consumer surplus under Model CC is highest. CSR has a negative effect on social welfare under certain conditions.

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This paper constructs a mixed oligopoly model composed of a public enterprise and two private enterprises, and explores the equilibrium results under different carbon emission policies. In addition, this paper also analyzes the optimal carbon emission trading price and the optimal privatization level decision. The results show that the proportion of state-owned shares and the equity efficiency gap have impacts on the equilibrium results under different carbon emission policies. Privatization increases the profits of public firm but does not necessarily promote social welfare. Different carbon emission policy decisions have different impacts on the equilibrium results, and the emission reduction target is not completely consistent with the maximum social welfare target. The government can intervene by setting carbon emissions trading prices and making privatization decisions. Both full and partial privatization may be the optimal decision. Keywords: carbon emission policy; privatization; oligopoly; carbon emission trading price 1. Introduction With the increasingly negative impact of climate change, more and more attention is paid to the issue of carbon emissions (Sarkar et al. 2022a,b;Wang et al. 2022;Taleizadeh et al. 2021). It has become an international consensus to reduce carbon emissions through active policy measures (Chen & Nie, 2020a;Dabaghian et al. 2022). As early as 1997, to coordinate carbon emission behaviors, the participating countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change formulated the "Kyoto Protocol". One of the important emission reduction policies is to

This study considers a differentiated duopoly, including domestic and foreign enterprises, in trade, analyzes the impacts of product differentiation and productivity variance on equilibrium results, and explores the optimal trade policy in different competition modes. We find that differentiated products can boost the supply of foreign enterprises in a Cournot competition. In a home‐leading Stackelberg duopoly, increasing tariffs decreases consumer surplus but improves the home country's social welfare. The optimum‐welfare tariff of a home‐leading Stackelberg duopoly cannot exceed that of the foreign‐leading Stackelberg duopoly. An easy or tight tariff policy can be optimal, depending on the parameters and duopoly modes.

This paper constructs an oligopoly model incorporating corporate social responsibility (β) and consumer sensitivity (e). We analyze the impacts of β and e on overcapacity, profits, consumer surplus, and social welfare under Cournot competition, Stackelberg competition, and Price Leadership competition. The results show that different competition modes produce different degrees of overcapacity. β has complex impacts on profits and affects the comparisons of social welfare. e positively influences equilibrium results. Enterprises have the motivation to voluntarily undertake corporate social responsibility after introducing consumer sensitivity. However, their voluntary commitment level is always lower than that formulated by the government.