Optimal trade policy and welfare in a differentiated duopoly

Chen, Junlong; Xie, Xinran; Sun, Chaoqun; Li, Lin; Liu, Jiali

doi:10.1002/mde.3579

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 60 publications

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“…Wang et al (2023) provide empirical evidence to examine the relationship between common institutional ownership and corporate misconduct and indicate that common institutional ownership can effectively inhibit corporate misconduct. Chen et al (2024) examine the joint effects of unilateral cross ownership and emission‐reduction technology sharing on environmental and social performance. Cho and Lee (2024) consider the role of cross ownership in the green delegation and environmental cooperation and show that coordination failures may improve social welfare if the cross ownership is higher and market competition is intensive.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of common ownership on price and quality decisions in competing supply chains

Li,

Chen,

Xia

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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This paper examines the implications of common ownership on pricing and quality decisions in supply chains. Our results indicate that the presence of common ownership enhances the quality investment but increases the wholesale price. However, the presence of common ownership induces the retailers to charge lower sales price. Because of higher wholesale price and lower sales price, the manufacturer always benefits from the common ownership but the common ownership always hurts the retailers. The presence of common ownership always benefits consumer surplus and social welfare. The benefits of common ownership are more significant as the common ownership level becomes strong.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of common ownership on price and quality decisions in competing supply chains

Li,

Chen,

Xia

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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“…This paper uses the Stackelberg game to build the model, which is frequently used in the supply chain (Cai et al, 2016; Chen et al, 2022). Under the push supply chain setting, i.e., selling‐to‐the‐newsvendor model, the supplier who is the leader first sets a wholesale price

w

, and then the buyer who is the follower determines the order quantity.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The cash flows in push and pull supply chains under supply disruptions

2022

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In a supply chain with a supplier and a buyer, this paper studies two typical contracts: a push contract and a pull contract. The supplier suffers from a supply disruption, and the buyer faces uncertain demand. We derive the equilibrium solutions under both contracts. We show that the order quantity and the firms' profits always increase in the supplier's reliability probability. Furthermore, we investigate how the firms' unit capital opportunity costs and the supplier's reliability probability affect the firms' preference of contracts. Finally, we identify the conditions under which the push contract is better than the pull contract for different firms.

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“…At the same time, blockchain technology can be adopted (from the first stage). Using the same theoretical as Chen et al (2022), we give relevant Stackelberg game models, in which the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. The manufacturer produces products and sells them to retailers in the first stage, remanufactures the used products while producing new products in the second stage, and then decides which market to sell to according to the manufacturing ability and the price of the internal and external markets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancing supply chain resilience through government subsidies and blockchain adoption: Ensuring sustainability and preventing disruptions

Bai

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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As environmental protection becomes increasingly important, so does the significance of incorporating the recycling manufacturing model into the supply chain. Meanwhile, addressing supply chain disruption is imperative in the supply chain. To understand the relationship between remanufacturing and supply chain disruption, we studied the effect of supply chain disruption, remanufacturing, blockchain technology, and government subsidies on preventing supply chain disruption in the second period. There have two models in the following discussion. In the local market, a manufacturer M manufactures and recycles products for remanufacture in the second stage. At the same time, retailer R is responsible for the sales of products. We also add government subsidies and blockchain technology, discussing those roles in preventing supply chain disruptions in the second period. Blockchain technology and government subsidies are equally crucial in averting disruptions during the second period, although they may only provide partial protection against supply chain disruption.

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Optimal trade policy and welfare in a differentiated duopoly

Cited by 4 publications

References 60 publications

The effects of common ownership on price and quality decisions in competing supply chains

The effects of common ownership on price and quality decisions in competing supply chains

The cash flows in push and pull supply chains under supply disruptions

Enhancing supply chain resilience through government subsidies and blockchain adoption: Ensuring sustainability and preventing disruptions

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