We estimate the demand for imported cotton in China and assess the competitiveness of cotton-exporting countries. Given the assertion that developing countries are negatively affected by U.S. cotton subsidies, our focus is the price competition between the United States and competing exporters (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, India, and Uzbekistan). We further project how U.S. programs affect China's imports by country. Results indicate that if U.S. subsidies make other exporting countries worse off, this effect is lessened when global prices respond accordingly. If subsidies are eliminated, China's cotton imports may not fully recover from the temporary spike in global prices. Because cotton is one of the principal program crops in the United States, producers are eligible for the following types of government support: direct or decoupled payments, countercyclical payments based on target prices or revenue guarantees, marketing loan benefits, and crop revenue insurance.1 The United States has also administered other programs such as export credit guarantee programs (GSM-102 and GSM-103), the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP), and user marketing certificates (Step-2 payments).2 It has been argued that these programs significantly impact world markets by depressing world prices through excess production and trade (Alston and Brunke, 2006;Alston, Sumner, and Brunke, 2007;Quirke, 2002).China is the most important destination market for global cotton exports. Since China's accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001, its cotton imports increased from 56 million kg in 2001 to 3.6 billion kg by 2006, an increase of over 6,000%. This growth Andrew Muhammad is a senior research economist, Lihong McPhail is a research economist, and James Kiawu is an outlook economist with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Market and Trade Economics Division, Washington, D.C.We thank three anonymous reviewers and the editor, Darrell Bosch, for their helpful comments.The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and may not be attributed to the Economic Research Service or the U.S. Department of Agriculture.1 See Schmitz, Rossi, and Schmitz (2007) for a description of how these programs specifically apply to the U.S. cotton sector. 2 Step 2 payments were made to exporters and domestic mills to compensate for their purchase of higher priced U.S. upland cotton. In 2004, a WTO dispute settlement panel found that Step 2 payments and export credit guarantees were inconsistent with WTO commitments. Consequently, the United States terminated Step