2014
DOI: 10.21236/ada616394
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Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons Learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013

Abstract: Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and R… Show more

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Cited by 12 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…However, it has also led to intense clashes in local areas where civilians resided and gave rise to concerns of indiscriminate fire against civilians. This proceeded with the creation of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the liberation of areas across the south from al-Shabaab through a clear-hold-build strategy (Williams, 2017b;Bruton and Williams, 2014;. Its core tasks included: (1) protecting senior Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) officials and others engaged in the political reconciliation process;…”
Section: Somaliamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, it has also led to intense clashes in local areas where civilians resided and gave rise to concerns of indiscriminate fire against civilians. This proceeded with the creation of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and the liberation of areas across the south from al-Shabaab through a clear-hold-build strategy (Williams, 2017b;Bruton and Williams, 2014;. Its core tasks included: (1) protecting senior Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) officials and others engaged in the political reconciliation process;…”
Section: Somaliamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…76 Even areas under AMISOM and TFG control were not regularly patrolled, and after dark peacekeepers retreated to base, leaving insurgents to move relatively freely throughout Mogadishu. 77 Other tasks, such as facilitating humanitarian assistance, were severely hampered; during the period under study, the humanitarian conditions in Somalia worsened. 78 In order to make up for the obvious deficit in AMISOM's troop strength, in December 2008 the AU had called on the UN Security Council to deploy an International Stabilisation Force as well as a logistical support package to AMISOM.…”
Section: Amisom In Mogadishu: Peacekeepers Under Siegementioning
confidence: 99%