Coupon promotion and its two-stage price intervention on dual-channel supply chain

Li, Zonghuo; Yang, Wensheng; Liu, Xiaohong; Si, Yinyuan

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2020.106543

Cited by 26 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…In summary, as shown in Tables 1-3, the previous literature lacks consideration of consumers' free-riding behavior and spillover effect in retailer innovation inputs. Therefore, our model differs from previous studies in two areas: Firstly, the paper considers the retailer's innovation inputs and its spillover effect and constructs a Stackelberg game model to analyze the impact of the spillover effect, service innovation inputs and subsidy strategies on retailer channel pricing and profits and unlike the existing literature focuses on the innovation inputs in the dual-channel supply chains [14,15,31]. Secondly, in order to alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain, we propose the dual coordination mechanism, which is different from the existing innovation investment research [32][33][34].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, few scholars have used dual coordination mechanisms. Li et al [31] studied the role of coupons in pricing and channel competition under three different distribution models using bilateral revenuesharing contracts to coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and demonstrated their effectiveness. However, the authors did not integrate the two different types of contracts, nor did they include innovative services and their spillover effects.…”

Section: Coordination In Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coordination Mechanism of Dual-Channel Supply Chains Considering Retailer Innovation Inputs

Yang

Zhang

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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In response to the online channels established by manufacturers, physical retailers are starting to offer innovative services, which will intensify conflicts between manufacturers and retailers. Considering that the conflict will affect the operation efficiency and sustainable development of the supply chain, the coordination mechanism of a dual-channel supply chain has been established. In this study, we construct the Stackelberg game model based on consumer utility theory to analyze the complex mechanism of retailers’ innovation input level affecting supply chain operation and design the double coordination mechanism. The results show that: (1) an optimal combination of wholesale prices, retail prices and innovation input levels can optimize the operational efficiency of the supply chain, (2) Noncooperation among channel members affects the retailer’s product pricing, decreases the market share of the physical channel and increases the market demand of manufacturers, (3) The dual coordination mechanism can alleviate channel conflicts, which can improve the operational efficiency of the supply chain. This study provides several insights on the theory of organizational coordination and sustainable development in conflicts of dual-channel supply chains.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Coordination In Supply Chainsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination Mechanism of Dual-Channel Supply Chains Considering Retailer Innovation Inputs

Yang

Zhang

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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“…Osuna et al (2016) experimentally examine the role of category and brand characteristics by two types of targeted coupons. Li et al (2020) propose a dual-channel supply chain and investigate the role of coupons on pricing strategies and channel competition. Zhang et al (2020) provide an analytical model to examine the impact of coupon strategies on consumers' redemption behaviors.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Coupons, a tool for market segmentation and price discrimination, have become effective marketing means in online promotions (e.g., Li et al (2020)). According to Kantar report 1 , Integrated Print and Digital Promotion 2019, more than 214 billion e‐coupons were distributed on 129 billion websites, which are worth 460 billion US dollars.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who benefits when coupons are issued by a duopoly from an e‐market?

2021

Manage Decis Econ

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This study examines a two‐dimensional differentiation model of both vertical product preferences and horizontal coupon preferences and investigates how couponing affects firms' promotion strategies and profits. The results show that when e‐coupons are issued by Firm 1, Firm 2's equilibrium profit increases with Firm 1's cost. Given e‐coupon issued by both firms, equilibrium profits decrease in Firm 1's cost and increase with Firm 2's cost, respectively. To carry out coupon strategies, there exist lose–win, win–win, and lose–lose scenarios, depending on firms' costs. Our study can be used in many online shopping platforms, giving them a noteworthy basis for decision making.

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“…Besides, it guides consumers' channel transfer and promotes channel interaction (Li et al , 2020a). Even though, dual-channel supply chain enterprises are still unable to clarify the action mechanism of coupon promotion on operational strategies, especially when there are interactions between manufacturers and retailers' decisions (Li et al , 2020b). Furthermore, with the acceleration of product upgrading and the increase of uncertainty in the external environment, the effectiveness of coupon promotion in different sale seasons is quite different.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic pricing and coupon promotion strategies in a dual-channel supply chain based on differential game

Yang

2021

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PurposeThis paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain in which a manufacturer offers coupons in the online channel and the retailer in the offline channel. The optimal pricing and coupon promotion policies are explored, and the brand image under different promotion scenarios is studied.Design/methodology/approachThree differential game models, namely no coupon is offered, coupons offered by the manufacturer and coupons offered by the retailer, are constructed.FindingsThe results show that the manufacturer and retailer intend to conduct coupon promotions under a large coupon redemption rate. Coupon promotion derives a higher price and profit for the issuers, and the manufacturer can free-ride on the retailer's coupon promotion. The retailer's profit in the retailer-promotion scenario may be lower than that in the manufacturer-promotion scenario in some special conditions. Besides, price, coupon face value, brand image and profit increase over time. After multiple cycles game, the operational strategy evolves to an optimal equilibrium status.Originality/valueThis paper provides guidance and advice for dual-channel supply enterprises to implement joint pricing and coupon promotion strategies under multiple sales seasons.

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Coupon promotion and its two-stage price intervention on dual-channel supply chain

Cited by 26 publications

References 36 publications

Coordination Mechanism of Dual-Channel Supply Chains Considering Retailer Innovation Inputs

Coordination Mechanism of Dual-Channel Supply Chains Considering Retailer Innovation Inputs

Who benefits when coupons are issued by a duopoly from an e‐market?

Dynamic pricing and coupon promotion strategies in a dual-channel supply chain based on differential game

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