Coups and Democracy

Marinov, Nikolay; Goemans, H. E.

doi:10.1017/s0007123413000264

Cited by 199 publications

(135 citation statements)

References 69 publications

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“…In any form of democracy, civil-military relations are characterized by what Huntington (1995) defines as "objective civilian control". Marinov and Goemans (2013) show how many coups, in particular those after 1991, opened the door to democracy and placed the military under strong civilian control. This has profound consequences for military spending.…”

Section: Political Determinants Of Military Spendingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We expect coups followed by the installation of a military regime to be conducive to increasing the defense burden. Yet, history shows that post-coup governments are very heterogeneous (Marinov and Goemans 2013). When this is the case, the allocation of resources to the military may decline as a consequence of a democratization process, which places the military under strict civilian control.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

Bove

Nisticò

2014

Public Choice

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We explore how institutional set-ups, in particular changes in political institutions through coups d'état , can affect the way military expenditures are determined.We use a counterfactual approach, the synthetic control method, and compare the evolution of the military burden for 40 countries affected by coups with the evolution of a synthetic counterfactual that replicates the initial conditions and the potential outcomes of the countries of interest before exposure to coups. Our case studies suggest that successful coups result in a large increase in the military burden.However, when no effects or a decrease in the defense burden are found, it is often the consequence of a democratization process triggered by the coup. These results are in keeping with recent theoretical developments on the bargaining power of the military in authoritarian regimes. Failed coups, by contrast, produce a smaller, and mostly positive, effect on the military burden, possibly as a result of the incumbent's strategy to avert further challenges to the stability of the regime by buying off the military.JEL classification: H11, H56

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Section: Political Determinants Of Military Spendingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

Bove

Nisticò

2014

Public Choice

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“…7 Second, by outlining a more general argument about the role of information in self-enforcing democracy, it contributes to theoretical debates about how self-enforcing democracy can be established, and it brings international actors more explicitly into work on electoral 7. See, for example, Bunce and Wolchick 2011;Bush 2011;Donno 2008 andFinkel, Pérez-Liñan, and Seligson 2007;Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009;Gleditsch and Ward 2006;Marinov and Goemans 2013;Gourevitch 1978;Hyde 2007Hyde , 2009Hyde , and 2011Kelley 2012a and2012b;Levitsky and Way 2005Lindberg 2009;Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006;andPevehouse 2002 and revolutions and self-enforcing democracy. 8 Although international election observation is supported in part because of a belief that it helps promote democracy, the potential mechanisms by which election observation promotes democracy are not well theorized or tested.…”

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confidence: 99%

Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation

Hyde¹,

Marinov²

2014

Int Org

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This article argues that when democracy is not yet institutionalized, leaders have little incentive to push for clean elections, in part because they are likely to face accusations of fraud from domestic opposition groups regardless of their true behavior. Reputable international election observers can facilitate self-enforcing democracy by providing credible information about the quality of elections, thus increasing citizens’ ability to coordinate against the regime when election fraud occurs, and discrediting “sore loser” protests. Patterns of postelection protests are consistent with the argument, including that postelection protests are more likely and last longer following negative reports from international observers. International election observers help promote democracy by making postelection protest more accurate in the short term, thereby increasing incentives for leaders to hold democratic elections in the long term.

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“…Although it is difficult to evaluate counterfactuals about transnational influences, a recognition of the benefits of inclusion in other states in the region likely supported the agreement to share power, and the likelihood of external condemnation and sanctions deterred efforts to strive for exclusive dominance (see also Marinov & Goemans, 2014).…”

Section: Case Illustrationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Diffusion of Inclusion: An Open-Polity Model of Ethnic Power Sharing

Cederman

Gleditsch

Wucherpfennig

2017

Comparative Political Studies

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While there is a growing consensus that ethnic inclusion produces peace, less is known about what causes transitions to power sharing between ethnic groups in central governments in multiethnic states. The few studies that have addressed this question have proposed explanations stressing exclusively domestic factors. Yet, power sharing is spatially clustered, which suggests that diffusion may be at play. Inspired by studies of democratic diffusion, we study the spread of inclusive policies with an “open-polity model” that explicitly traces diffusion from inclusion in other states. Our findings indicate that the relevant diffusion processes operate primarily at the level of world regions rather than globally or between territorial neighbors. Thus, the more inclusive the region, the more likely a shift to power sharing becomes. Shifts away from inclusion to dominance are less common since World War II, but they are more likely in regional settings characterized by ethnic exclusion.

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Coups and Democracy

Cited by 199 publications

References 69 publications

Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

Coups d’état and defense spending: a counterfactual analysis

Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation

The Diffusion of Inclusion: An Open-Polity Model of Ethnic Power Sharing

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