1993
DOI: 10.1001/jama.1993.03500160086038
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Court-Ordered Reimbursement for Unproven Medical Technology

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Cited by 26 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Despite genuine efforts by Medicare offifi cials to use cost-effectiveness analysis to determine reimbursement and coverage decisions in the Medicare program, Congress has been unwilling to do so. In court, insurance contracts are often interpreted in favor of the insured, and courts are reluctant to use published scientific literature to make rulings about what should be covered and what should not (Ferguson, Dubinsky, and Kirsch, 1993). Given that Medicare reimburses without regard to the underlying value of health gains, or health gains relative to alternative treatments, it becomes very difficult for a private insurer, especially a single insurer, to take the lead on applying comparative effectiveness research (Chandra and Skinner, forthcoming).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Despite genuine efforts by Medicare offifi cials to use cost-effectiveness analysis to determine reimbursement and coverage decisions in the Medicare program, Congress has been unwilling to do so. In court, insurance contracts are often interpreted in favor of the insured, and courts are reluctant to use published scientific literature to make rulings about what should be covered and what should not (Ferguson, Dubinsky, and Kirsch, 1993). Given that Medicare reimburses without regard to the underlying value of health gains, or health gains relative to alternative treatments, it becomes very difficult for a private insurer, especially a single insurer, to take the lead on applying comparative effectiveness research (Chandra and Skinner, forthcoming).…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But in practice there are additional constraints on insurance contracts that limit the availability of lower-cost, higher-value plans. In a world of evolving medical technology and complex care management, it is impossible to fully specify contingent contracts outlining all the care that individuals can receive in every state of the world, and private insurers have limited ability to deny coverage for procedures with unproven benefits when Medicare covers these technologies (Ferguson et al 1993).…”
Section: Private Health Spendingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When Medicare covers Provenge for prostate cancer (at a cost of over $90,000 for a few months of survival), private insurers are likely to follow the coverage decision to avoid litigation in which their patients claim that insurers are withholding valuable care (Ferguson et al 1993). Medicare regulatory boards evaluating new technology focus on whether drugs or procedures provide any benefits and are typically precluded from considering costs.…”
Section: Public Health Insurancementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Similarly, Gerard Anderson (1992) argued that courts have expanded their influence over health policy by, for example, overturning insurers' coverage decisions and favoring hospitals, as opposed to states, in Medicaid rate-setting cases under the Boren Amendment. 14 Other commentators have also argued that courts have tended to side with individual patients against insurers in deciding whether expensive technologies are covered benefits (Ferguson, Dubinsky, and Kirsch 1993).…”
Section: Cea and Cost-containment In Medical Liability Casesmentioning
confidence: 99%