Courts, Power, and Rights in Argentina and Chile

Scribner, Druscilla

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511976520.010

Cited by 10 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…A more elaborate process for the selection of judges (including a provision for a two-thirds majority in the Senate) has contributed to this development. Gradually, therefore, the Court has come to regain the position-as an autonomous arbitrator and protector of rights-it used to have some hundred years ago Scribner 2011).…”

Section: Trends In Latin Americamentioning

confidence: 99%

American Exceptionalism Revisited

Hadenius¹

2015

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Section: Trends In Latin Americamentioning

confidence: 99%

American Exceptionalism Revisited

Hadenius¹

2015

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“…It should be noted that several important studies on Latin American high courts(Helmke, 2002(Helmke, , 2005Iaryczower et al, 2002;Scribner, 2011;Kapiszewski, 2012; seeKapiszewski and Taylor, 2008 for an overview) suggest court outcomes and policy influence reflect the political leanings of judges, but such studies are not interested directly in how judges' political affiliations affect the frequency of dissent. In these studies, the judges' ideology is usually defined in terms of the judges' alignment with the sitting president (rather than parties per se) Helmke (2002Helmke ( , 2005.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In these studies, the judges' ideology is usually defined in terms of the judges' alignment with the sitting president (rather than parties per se) Helmke (2002Helmke ( , 2005. analyzes executive decrees andIaryczower et al (2002) analyze decrees and congressional laws Scribner (2011),. who also focused on case outcomes, codes Latin American judges on a liberal/conservative continuum, but only for a limited number of cases.Political determinants of judicial dissent 381…”

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The political determinants of judicial dissent: evidence from the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal

Tiede

2015

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Many judicial scholars argue that judicial dissent stems from partisanship or political differences among judges on courts. These arguments are evaluated using the variation in political backgrounds on a constitutional court, Chile’s Constitutional Tribunal, using case-level and vote-level data from 1990 until 2010. The analysis shows that the rate of dissent rises after major reforms to the powers and judicial selection mechanism of the Tribunal in 2005 and that the dissent rate corresponds to periods of greater partisanship on the court. Further, decisions regarding the unconstitutionality of laws intensify the propensity to dissent at both the case and judge level. In further examination of variation across judges’ voting records, judges who have identifiable partisan associations of any kind are generally more likely to dissent than those with limited political backgrounds.

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“…Especially because of its internal nomination process, the Supreme Court reflected a substantial continuity of pretransition interests and has more generally been seen as a conservative force along these lines (Correa Sutil 1997). Because of this continuity, the Supreme Court, like other institutions has been regarded by some segments of society as part of an authoritarian legacy (Prillaman 2000; Barros 2002; Drake & Jaksić 1995; Loveman 1995; Scribner 2004, 2011).…”

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confidence: 99%

Judicial Behavior on the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal

Carroll

Tiede

2011

J Empirical Legal Studies

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Research on judicial independence suggests that high courts can be designed to serve as external checks on political actors. However, independence from political influence does not necessarily imply incentives to use these powers. Chile's Constitutional Tribunal, while possessing significant powers, has been characterized as generally deferential to political actors. Using rulings from the Tribunal from 1990–2010, we examine whether reforms that increased the number of judges appointed by politicians and expanded the Tribunal's jurisdiction have contributed to a more assertive use of judicial review power. We find that the reforms have not produced an increased tendency to rule laws unconstitutional under abstract review. However, the new appointment structure has nevertheless increased the types of judges relatively more likely to assert this power. Specifically, after the reforms, judges appointed by elected actors were individually more likely to find laws unconstitutional than those appointed by the Supreme Court, especially on cases of concrete review of enacted laws. We also find that cases of abstract review brought by legislators have been especially associated with both unconstitutional rulings and individual judicial votes for unconstitutionality.

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Courts, Power, and Rights in Argentina and Chile

Cited by 10 publications

References 25 publications

American Exceptionalism Revisited

American Exceptionalism Revisited

The political determinants of judicial dissent: evidence from the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal

Judicial Behavior on the Chilean Constitutional Tribunal

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