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With the enormous expansion of scholarship on this subject, "rule of law" has come to mean different things-ranging from security and order to the operations of courts and the administration of justice. We review the various streams of theoretical and empirical research by academics and practitioners, emphasizing the connections to economic development. The core logic is that security of property rights and integrity of contract underpin, respectively, investment and trade, which in turn fuel economic growth and development. However, property rights and contracts rest on institutions, which themselves rest on coalitions of interests. Formal institutions are important, but, particularly in developing countries, informal institutional arrangements play a significant part as well. These considerations lead us to caution against an exaggerated confidence in the ability of development assistance to implant new institutions for the rule of law.

Research on judicial independence suggests that high courts can be designed to serve as external checks on political actors. However, independence from political influence does not necessarily imply incentives to use these powers. Chile's Constitutional Tribunal, while possessing significant powers, has been characterized as generally deferential to political actors. Using rulings from the Tribunal from 1990–2010, we examine whether reforms that increased the number of judges appointed by politicians and expanded the Tribunal's jurisdiction have contributed to a more assertive use of judicial review power. We find that the reforms have not produced an increased tendency to rule laws unconstitutional under abstract review. However, the new appointment structure has nevertheless increased the types of judges relatively more likely to assert this power. Specifically, after the reforms, judges appointed by elected actors were individually more likely to find laws unconstitutional than those appointed by the Supreme Court, especially on cases of concrete review of enacted laws. We also find that cases of abstract review brought by legislators have been especially associated with both unconstitutional rulings and individual judicial votes for unconstitutionality.

This paper analyzes whether and to what extent countries reconstitute the rule of law following civil conflict. Drawing on an original data set of 47 cases in which conflict ended between 1970 and 1999, we find that the cessation of conflict has at best a modest effect on the rule of law. On average, countries revert to the pre‐conflict rule‐of‐law status quo ante. In simple models, rule of law prior to the onset of conflict is the best indicator of post‐conflict performance. Analysis of individual cases using structural break analysis shows that the cessation of conflict is not typically associated with an inflection in the rule of law; improvements are modest, take a long time, and fall far short of plausible thresholds for robust rule of law.

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