The Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Settings: The Empirical Record

Abstract

This paper analyzes whether and to what extent countries reconstitute the rule of law following civil conflict. Drawing on an original data set of 47 cases in which conflict ended between 1970 and 1999, we find that the cessation of conflict has at best a modest effect on the rule of law. On average, countries revert to the pre‐conflict rule‐of‐law status quo ante. In simple models, rule of law prior to the onset of conflict is the best indicator of post‐conflict performance. Analysis of individual cases using structural break analysis shows that the cessation of conflict is not typically associated with an inflection in the rule of law; improvements are modest, take a long time, and fall far short of plausible thresholds for robust rule of law.

The democracy dilemma. Aid, power-sharing governments, and post-conflict democratization

“…What is more, powerful judges might prevent elites from winning elections, for instance through unfavorable rulings in the case of close election outcomes. In this situation, an independent judiciary functions less as a form of ''future insurance policy'' (Finkel, 2008;Haggard and Tiede, 2014) and more as an obstacle to reaping the economic benefits of political power.…”

Cracks in the Foundations: Understanding the Great Rule of Law Debate in the EU

“…Traditionally the purview of constitutional lawyers and political philosophers, the rule of law has, particularly over the last decade, been heralded as a panacea for a host of human ills – poverty, democratic dysfunction, conflict – and become the darling of policy‐makers and scholars in a plethora of disciplines: from comparative democratization (Magen and Morlino, ; Fukuyama, ) and development economics (Dam, ; Haggard and Tiede, ), to security and conflict‐resolution studies (USAID, ; Grenfell, ; Haggard and Tiede, ). Amidst a host of deep cleavages, between east and west, north and south, as Tamanaha () observes: ‘there appears to be widespread agreement, traversing all fault lines, on one point, and one point alone: that the “rule of law” is good for everyone’ (p. 1).…”

Judicial Impartiality and Independence in Divided Societies: An Empirical Analysis of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina

“…Even in relatively homogenous democracies, constitutional courts are often seen to be highly politicized in terms of their appointment processes, decisionmaking, and the kinds of cases they hear (Amaral-Garcia, Garoupa, and Grembi 2009;Garoupa, Gomez-Pomar, and Grembi 2013;H€ onnige 2009). But courts in deeply divided polities face special dangers and challenges, particularly in the wake of conflict where the rule of law is weak (Haggard and Tiede 2014). Minorities may worry that the court will be indefinitely captured by the majority and, consequently, have little or no confidence in the court's ability to protect their rights and interests (Sadurski 2014: 304-28).…”