With the enormous expansion of scholarship on this subject, "rule of law" has come to mean different things-ranging from security and order to the operations of courts and the administration of justice. We review the various streams of theoretical and empirical research by academics and practitioners, emphasizing the connections to economic development. The core logic is that security of property rights and integrity of contract underpin, respectively, investment and trade, which in turn fuel economic growth and development. However, property rights and contracts rest on institutions, which themselves rest on coalitions of interests. Formal institutions are important, but, particularly in developing countries, informal institutional arrangements play a significant part as well. These considerations lead us to caution against an exaggerated confidence in the ability of development assistance to implant new institutions for the rule of law.

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I develop a systematic argument about the politics of the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis. I focus on institutions—specifically, the connection linking the institutional framework of national politics, the policy environment, and investment. I seek to resolve the tension between the literatures on credible policy commitment and policy flexibility, arguing that if either is severely undersupplied, the risk associated with the policy environment rises rapidly for investors. Building on a veto player framework, I develop a simple model of a U-shaped relationship between the number of veto players in a political system and policy risk to investors. Institutional vetoes on executive authority lower policy risk for investors but only up to a point, after which additional veto players promote unwelcome policy rigidity. I illustrate this using four cases: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the four main Southeast Asian countries involved in the financial crisis. I argue that the institutional framework of national politics had a powerful and predictable influence on policy responses and investor reactions.

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