Covert Derogations and Judicial Deference: Redefining Liberty and Due Process Rights in Counterterrorism Law and Beyond

Abstract

This article considers the use of control orders in the United Kingdom as an example of one of the most important legal aspects of the “war on terror”: the development, alongside the criminal justice approach, of a pre-emptive system. It argues that in relation to such orders the executive has in effect sought to redefine key human rights in a manner that, at its most extreme, amounts to covert derogation, and that both Parliament and the judiciary have been to an extent drawn into and made complicit in this process. It highlights key aspects of this story in order to illustrate some broader points about the role of judges, Parliament, and the rule of law in response to such exceptional measures. It argues that the attempted minimization of the ambit of rights, the spreading use of secret evidence, and the damaging constitutional impact of excessive judicial deference, are of great significance beyond UK counterterrorism law and can help illuminate both the opportunities and the dangers in constitutional dialogue.Cet article étudie les ordres de contrôle au Royaume-Uni à titre d’exemple d’un des aspects les plus importants de la réponse juridique à la « guerre contre le terrorisme » : le virage d’une justice pénale réactive vers la création d’un système préemptif parallèle. Les auteurs soutiennent qu’en ce qui a trait à ces ordres, l’exécutif tente de redéfinir les droits fondamentaux de la personne, ce qui, dans les situations extrêmes, revient à y déroger secrètement. Ils ajoutent que tant le Parlement que l’appareil judiciaire ont d’une certaine manière été associés à ce processus et en sont devenus complices. L’essai souligne certains aspects de cet enjeu afin d’illustrer des questions plus larges sur le rôle des juges, du Parlement et de la primauté du droit face à de telles mesures exceptionnelles. Les auteurs soutiennent que cette tentative de réduire la portée des droits, l’utilisation croissante d’éléments secrets de preuve ainsi que les effets dommageables de la déférence judiciaire excessive sur la constitution ont une importance qui s’étend au-delà des lois anti-terroristes britanniques. Ces enjeux peuvent jeter de la lumière tant sur les bienfaits que sur les dangers du dialogue constitutionnel

Contagion, counterterrorism and criminology: The Case of France

“…Yet it would be misleading not to acknowledge the existence of these trends elsewhere. The prolific use of suspicionless stop and search powers in the UK (until 2012) has already been noted, and this has been accompanied by concerns about the spread of the special advocate procedure to other areas of the criminal law (Fenwick and Phillipson, 2011) as well as the abuse of surveillance powers to monitor minor criminal activity such as dog fouling (Longstaff and Graham, 2008). In Poland, another country included in the current study, recent counterterrorist legislation concerning 'terrorism' and 'terrorist incidents' has been drafted so broadly and with such a lack of imprecision that Amnesty International has called into serious question the connection of the examples provided (e.g.…”

“…‘the contagion thesis’. While many different labels have been applied to describe this phenomenon, among them normalization (Kilcommins and Vaughan, 2004), creep (Appleby and Williams, 2010), contamination (Fenwick and Phillipson, 2011) and transplantation (Donohue, 2012), contagion appeared to us the most appropriate term given the seriousness with which it conveyed the threat to the ordinary criminal justice system. A medical metaphor with its obvious connotations for public health also appeared to us to communicate more effectively the risks associated with the spread of policies not only in time (in terms of temporary legislation becoming permanent), but also cross-sectorally.…”

Shifting Emergencies from the Political to the Legal Sphere: Placing the United Kingdomms Derogations from the ECHR in Historical Context

“…145 As Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson assert, '[t]he withdrawal of the derogation from the right to liberty amounted to a public affirmation by the British government of its intention to protect British citizens from terrorism while remaining within … normal human rights standards'. 146 Over four years later, in A v United Kingdom, 147 Strasbourg finally became involved in the case, addressing issues left over from Belmarsh Detainees. This meant that, because a ruling that the derogation did not comply with Article 15's requirements no longer affected operative UK law, the Court's Grand Chamber was able to reassess its existing case law in a relatively uncontroversial context.…”

Discolouring Democracy? Policing, Sensitive Evidence, and Contentious Deaths in the United Kingdom

“…32 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, although there remain traces of the long tradition of judicial deference to the executive on matters of national security, 33 in cases challenging the control order regime, for instance,`the courts have displayed a relative boldness that contrasts strongly with the approach taken in much earlier decisions'. 34 However, and notwithstanding the hard-fought advances to preserve a core`irreducible minimum' 35 of procedural fairness in the law of national security, Tomkins argues, the situation`remains precarious'. 36 Contemporary views, expressed by the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, and the European Court 629 of Justice, about the indispensability of procedural fairness in national security and the due process of law, are evidence that`grave concerns as to the fairness of closed material exist at the very highest levels both of law and of politics and that these concerns are only partly tempered by the use of special advocates'.…”