Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play

Ferreira, José Luis; Gilboa, Itzhak; Maschler, Michael

doi:10.1006/game.1995.1033

Cited by 6 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…j, this contradicts the fact that s is a credible equilibrium. If i. k = i. j, by theorem 5.1 in Ferreira et al [6], there exists another deviation s * struck by i. j such that s * is a credible deviation from s. But then s is not a credible equilibrium, which is a contradiction. ٗ…”

Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 91%

“…The concept of credible equilibrium was introduced by Ferreira et al [6] to handle situations in which priorities change during the conflict. In this preliminary section, we present their extensive-form game model and the solution concept, called credible equilibrium, which generalizes the concept of Nash equilibrium.…”

Section: Credible Equilibria In Finite Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These concepts are defined recursively. For further information concerning these concepts, see Ferreira et al [6].…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Ferreira et al [6] propose to model these situations as extensive form games where the different information sets of a given player define a set of agents of that player. They consider only finite games and, after endowing each agent with a utility function of his own, define recursively an equilibrium concept that takes into account two important features.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…

Credible equilibria were defined in Ferreira et al [6] to handle situations of preferences changing along time in a model given by an extensive form game. This paper extends the definition to the case of infinite games and, more important, to games with non-perfect recall.

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confidence: 99%

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Sánchez¹,

García²

1998

Annals of Operations Research

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Credible equilibria were defined in Ferreira et al. [6] to handle situations of preferences changing along time in a model given by an extensive form game. This paper extends the definition to the case of infinite games and, more important, to games with non-perfect recall. These games are of great interest in possible applications of the model, but the original definition was not applicable to them. The difficulties of this extension are solved by using some ideas in the literature of abstract systems and by proposing new ones that may prove useful in more general settings.

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Section: Propositionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Section: Credible Equilibria In Finite Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These concepts are defined recursively. For further information concerning these concepts, see Ferreira et al [6].…”

Section: Definitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…

…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sánchez¹,

García²

1998

Annals of Operations Research

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A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox

Gilboa

1997

Games and Economic Behavior

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Games with Type Indeterminate Players

Lambert-Mogiliansky

Martínez-Martínez

2015

Quantum Interaction

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The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that uses some elements of quantum formalism to model the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we extend the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making. In Part I we introduce TI-games by means of an example.A 2X2 game is investigated. We let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise exchange game. We show in a numerical example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have impact on next following behavior when the standard classical model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the players' type. In Part II, we formulate some basic concepts for the analysis of games with type indeterminate players. We develop the theory in close connection with the standard approach to game of incomplete information à la Harsanyi. We show an equivalence between static games of incomplete information and static TI-games. We extend this equivalence result to dynamic commuting TI-games. Finally, we develop a new solution concept for non-commuting dynamic TI-games. It differs from the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium by one single property characterizing the updating rule. This property captures the novelty brought about by Type Indeterminacy namely that in addition to affecting payoffs, the action of a player impacts on the profile of types and thus on future actions. We provide an example showing that strategies that form a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium are not part of any Perfect TI-equilibrium.

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Credible Equilibria in Games with Utilities Changing during the Play

Cited by 6 publications

References 13 publications

Untitled

Untitled

A Comment on the Absent-Minded Driver Paradox

Games with Type Indeterminate Players

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