Cross-segmental parties in consociational systems: Downplaying prowess to access power in Northern Ireland

Abstract

Political parties are afforded a key role in making consociational democracy work; however, parties that dis-identify with salient identities and appeal to voters across the ethno-political divide face barriers when interacting with voters and with other, segmental parties. Nevertheless, such cross-segmental parties often thrive and even ascend to power. Northern Ireland’s cross-segmental parties – the Alliance Party, the Green Party, and People before Profit – have sought to traverse group-specific voter interests and set their agenda apart from that of segmental parties. For such parties to be considered ‘coalitionable’, they should outline their (potential) governing contribution to complement other political parties’ agendas. Cross-segmental parties’ participation in government makes them appear electable, but it is the focus on bipartisan concerns that consolidates their electoral success and ensures their political relevance. We focus on the evolution of Alliance’s political agenda and fill a gap in the literature on the relevance of cross-segmental parties in consociations.

Do birds of a feather flock together? Patterns of ethnolinguistic group representation in the Brussels Capital Region

“…The Brussels Parliament, officially created in 1989, consists of 89 members, and comprised of 72 French speakers and 17 Dutch speakers (Deschouwer, 2012;Jarrett, 2018;Pilet, 2005). Furthermore, at the governmental level, the Dutch speakers are entitled to at least two 2 Civic parties are those which mobilize on bases other than (exclusive) ethnicity (Agarin & Jarrett, 2021;Murtagh, 2015Murtagh, , 2020Stojanović, 2018). The literature discusses them under several guises (Murtagh, 2020), amongst others: 'multi-ethnic' and 'nonethnic' (Chandra, 2004;Horowitz, 1985, pp.…”

Making Representative Politics Work: Cross‐Segmental Parties in Consociations

“…Regardless of the number of seats they could claim, their participation in government or, indeed, their electoral promise being reflected in policy outputs, cross‐segmental parties are not always viewed by (some) voters as important players in consociational systems that encourage protection of someone's vital interests but discourage representation of cross‐segmental concerns of all. In short, the existence of cross‐segmental parties signals the rising electoral pressure of changing preferences in voters regarding the substance of political representation, in that ‘the likes’ no longer need to vote for ‘the likes’ to feel represented (Agarin & Jarrett, 2022). Thus, the zero‐sum choice between the two modalities of representation in consociations – descriptive (of their group's vital interest, if voting for a representative of their politically relevant segment) or substantive (of their specific concerns, if voting for a candidate or a party with a cross‐segmental appeal) – no longer stands uncontested.…”

“…Thus, the zero‐sum choice between the two modalities of representation in consociations – descriptive (of their group's vital interest, if voting for a representative of their politically relevant segment) or substantive (of their specific concerns, if voting for a candidate or a party with a cross‐segmental appeal) – no longer stands uncontested. Scholars, however, have been largely silent on the reasons for cross‐segmental parties' access and contribution to government, in part due to their limited visibility, but have nevertheless reflected on the experience of APNI (see, Agarin & Jarrett, 2022; McCulloch & Zdeb, 2022; Murtagh, 2020).…”

“…Rather, the domineering grip of entrenched representatives of politically salient groups in the decision‐making process might be a more effective criterion for mobilising electoral support. It has been determined that cross‐segmental parties need to demonstrate how their agendas complement those of segmental parties in order to be ‘coalitionable’ in Northern Ireland (Agarin & Jarrett, 2022). We therefore envisage that focusing on bipartisan concerns could also aide cross‐segmental parties' access to consociational governments, ensuring their re‐election and long‐term relevance for consociational systems.…”

What Do We Know about Power Sharing after 50 Years?

“…Most importantly, the theory did not predict the emergence of ethnic parties that would appeal to voters beyond their own ethnic group (Murtagh and McCulloch 2021). Nor did the theory allow for the possibility of the rise of cross-ethnic civic parties and social movements as is the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon and Northern Ireland (Agarin and Jarrett 2021; Deets 2018; Milan 2019; Murtagh 2020; Nagle 2016). This begs the following question: why do cross-ethnic social movements emerge under some power-sharing systems but not others?…”