Crowdsourcing contest dilemma

Abstract

Crowdsourcing offers unprecedented potential for solving tasks efficiently by tapping into the skills of large groups of people. A salient feature of crowdsourcing-its openness of entry-makes it vulnerable to malicious behaviour. Such behaviour took place in a number of recent popular crowdsourcing competitions. We provide game-theoretic analysis of a fundamental trade-off between the potential for increased productivity and the possibility of being set back by malicious behaviour. Our results show that in crowdsourcing competitions malicious behaviour is the norm, not the anomaly-a result contrary to the conventional wisdom in the area. Counterintuitively, making the attacks more costly does not deter them but leads to a less desirable outcome. These findings have cautionary implications for the design of crowdsourcing competitions.

Game-Theoretic Design of Optimal Two-Sided Rating Protocols for Service Exchange Dilemma in Crowdsourcing

“…Over the past decade, techniques for securing crowdsourcing operations have been expanding steadily, so has the number of applications of crowdsourcing [9]. However, users in a crowdsourcing platform have the opportunity to exhibit antisocial behaviors due to the openness of crowdsourcing, and hence crowdsourcing is stripped of aureole when collective efforts are derailed or severely hindered by elaborate sabo-tage [10], [11]. As part of crowdsourcing, service exchange applications have proliferated as the medium that allows users to exchange valuable services.…”

Crowdsourcing software evaluation

“…EAESE '14, 13-14 Despite the potentials of crowdsourcing, coming essentially from an easy and broad access to the crowd, the establishment of correct and efficient crowdsourcing platforms is a challenging problem mainly because of the same reasons of its potentials, i.e. the high openness and large scale [3]. Most of the existing studies in crowdsourcing in general, and those exploiting the paradigm for software evaluation, e.g.…”

“…The authorization could be formal using some strict form of identity check, e.g. through a link to official emails of staff recruited to do the tasks, or social based on the reputation of members of crowd and how they did in past studies [3,4].…”

Law of corresponding states for open collaborations

“…Some of the main open questions concern the efficiency and the predictability of such social collaboration processes [9][10][11][12][13][14][15]. However, despite the large amount of available data, they are still largely unexplored quantitatively, making it difficult to interpret empirical data and make useful predictions [16][17][18][19].…”