Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an important, overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing

Piazza, Jared; Landy, Justin F.; Goodwin, Geoffrey P.

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2013.12.013

Cited by 88 publications

(162 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…Past research by Piazza et al (2014) have found that harmful agents are ascribed less moral standing than neutral and benevolent agents. These authors showed that it is the perceived harmful character of the target, and not the perceived agency, that influences judgments of moral standing at least among non-human animal targets.…”

Section: The Present Studies and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One of the difficulties with interpreting the moral typecasting hypothesis involves the various ways in which agency has been operationally defined (for a thorough review, see Piazza et al, 2014). In the literature on mind perception, agency is often defined in terms of "higher" cognitive capacities, such as being able to reason, communicate, exert self-control, imagine, and plan one's actions (see especially Gray et al, 2007; but also Gray & Schein, 2012;Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012;Gray & Wegner, 2012;Haslam et al, 2008;Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010).…”

Section: Moral Typecasting Dehumanization and Defining Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, Gray and Wegner (2009) also suggest there are "general" aspects of agency (e.g., being "determined, "powerful") that might be ubiquitous to all agents (see Gray & Wegner, 2009, Study 4b). Thus, there are several perspectives on agency and its definition, with research revealing at least two important aspects: intelligence (or "cognition" broadly defined) and the capacity for effective goal-directed activity (see Piazza et al, 2014). …”

Section: Moral Typecasting Dehumanization and Defining Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is probably no moral intuition more fundamental and ubiquitous than the rejection of cruelty or the infliction of harm for purely selfish reasons (Gert, 2004;Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009;Greene, 2012;Henrich et al, 2006;Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014;Pinker, 2012;Sinnott-Armstrong, 2009;Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009;Sousa & Piazza, 2014;Turiel, 1983). Historically, societies have not always agreed on which actions constitute cruelty or which individuals and entities are deserving of protection from such abuses (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014;Piazza et al, 2014;Singer, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Historically, societies have not always agreed on which actions constitute cruelty or which individuals and entities are deserving of protection from such abuses (Haslam & Loughnan, 2014;Piazza et al, 2014;Singer, 2011). Yet this fact does not negate the core intuition that individuals who cause unjustified harm have violated an implicit social contract to respect the basic interests of others (Baumard, Andre, & Sperber, 2013;Sousa & Piazza, 2014), or the retributive logic that harmful agents are deserving of punishment (Ashworth, 2010;Baumard, 2011;Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002;Darley & Pittman, 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Perceiving the agency of harmful agents: A test of dehumanization versus moral typecasting accounts

2016

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It is clear that harmful agents are targets of severe condemnation, but it is much less clear how perceivers conceptualize the agency of harmful agents. The current studies tested two competing predictions made by moral typecasting theory and the dehumanization literature. Across six studies, harmful agents were perceived to possess less agency than neutral (non-offending) and benevolent agents, consistent with a dehumanization perspective but inconsistent with the assumptions of moral typecasting theory. This was observed for human targets (Studies 1-2b, and 4-5) and corporations (Study 3), and across various gradations of harmfulness (Studies 3-4).Importantly, denial of agency to harmful agents occurred even when controlling for perceptions of the agent's likeability (Studies 2a and 2b) and while using two different operationalizations of agency (Study 2a). Study 5 showed that harmful agents are denied agency primarily through an inferential process, and less through motivations to see the agent punished. Across all six studies, harmful agents were deemed less worthy of moral standing as a consequence of their harmful conduct and this reduction in moral standing was mediated through reductions in agency. Our findings clarify a current tension in the moral cognition literature, which have direct implications for the moral typecasting framework.

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Section: The Present Studies and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Moral Typecasting Dehumanization and Defining Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Moral Typecasting Dehumanization and Defining Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Perceiving the agency of harmful agents: A test of dehumanization versus moral typecasting accounts

2016

Self Cite

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Attributions of Consciousness

Sytsma¹

2016

A Companion to Experimental Philosophy

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Self‐punishment promotes reconciliation with third parties by addressing the symbolic implications of wrongdoing

Vel-Palumbo

Wenzel

Woodyatt

2019

Euro J Social Psych

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Self‐punishment is a highly costly—and potentially harmful—way transgressors can respond to a wrongdoing. In this research, we propose that people might punish themselves in part because it has a communicative social function. Three studies using hypothetical vignettes showed that self‐punishment facilitates reconciliation with third party observers by addressing the symbolic implications of wrongdoing. Specifically, self‐punishment establishes a moral value consensus and/or diminishes offender status/power, and through this, increases third party perceptions of justice and transgressor remorse, and the third party's willingness to reconcile. This effect was robust to manipulations designed to make third parties question the sincerity of the self‐punisher's intention. Self‐punishment thus serves a beneficial interpersonal function by repairing social bonds between transgressors and their peers.

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Cruel nature: Harmfulness as an important, overlooked dimension in judgments of moral standing

Cited by 88 publications

References 40 publications

Perceiving the agency of harmful agents: A test of dehumanization versus moral typecasting accounts

Perceiving the agency of harmful agents: A test of dehumanization versus moral typecasting accounts

Attributions of Consciousness

Self‐punishment promotes reconciliation with third parties by addressing the symbolic implications of wrongdoing

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