CsFire: Transparent Client-Side Mitigation of Malicious Cross-Domain Requests

Ryck, Philippe De; Desmet, Lieven; Heyman, Thomas; Piessens, Frank; Joosen, Wouter

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-11747-3_2

Cited by 38 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…As discussed in this paper, the majority of all Web applications utilize the SID as the de facto authentication credential. In consequence, RequestRodeo (and its further refinements, such as [33]) could benefit from our SID detection algorithm (see Section 3) in respect to false positive reduction.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

SessionShield: Lightweight Protection against Session Hijacking

Nikiforakis

Meert

Younan

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. The class of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities is the most prevalent security problem in the field of Web applications. One of the main attack vectors used in connection with XSS is session hijacking via session identifier theft. While session hijacking is a client-side attack, the actual vulnerability resides on the server-side and, thus, has to be handled by the website's operator. In consequence, if the operator fails to address XSS, the application's users are defenseless against session hijacking attacks. In this paper we present SessionShield, a lightweight client-side protection mechanism against session hijacking that allows users to protect themselves even if a vulnerable website's operator neglects to mitigate existing XSS problems. SessionShield is based on the observation that session identifier values are not used by legitimate clientside scripts and, thus, need not to be available to the scripting languages running in the browser. Our system requires no training period and imposes negligible overhead to the browser, therefore, making it ideal for desktop and mobile systems.

show abstract

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

SessionShield: Lightweight Protection against Session Hijacking

Nikiforakis

Meert

Younan

et al. 2011

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…At each outgoing request, the domain of the request is checked against the originating domain and if they don't match, the requests are stripped from their credentials. De Ryck et al [21] extend this system, by moving it into the browser where more context-information is available. Shahriar and Zulkernine [22] propose a detection technique where each cross-domain request is checked against the visibility of the code that originated it in the user's browser.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

DEMACRO: Defense against Malicious Cross-Domain Requests

Lekies

Nikiforakis

Tighzert

et al. 2012

Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. In the constant evolution of the Web, the simple always gives way to the more complex. Static webpages with click-through dialogues are becoming more and more obsolete and in their place, asynchronous JavaScript requests, Web mash-ups and proprietary plug-ins with the ability to conduct cross-domain requests shape the modern user experience. Three recent studies showed that a significant number of Web applications implement poor cross-domain policies allowing malicious domains to embed Flash and Silverlight applets which can conduct arbitrary requests to these Web applications under the identity of the visiting user. In this paper, we confirm the findings of the aforementioned studies and we design DEMACRO, a client-side defense mechanism which detects potentially malicious cross-domain requests and de-authenticates them by removing existing session credentials. Our system requires no training or user interaction and imposes minimal performance overhead on the user's browser.

show abstract

“…One of the primary causes of CSRF attacks is the misuse of cached credentials in cross-domain requests [7]. The attacker can easily send some requests to web applications in another trusted web site without the user involvement and knowledge.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The attacker can easily send some requests to web applications in another trusted web site without the user involvement and knowledge. This makes web browser send cross-site requests, while implicitly using cached credentials in web browser [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The attacker is able to abuse this duration to make some user's browser perform authenticated requests probably without their knowledge, and that is what is called cross site request forgery CSRF. www.ijacsa.thesai.org A number of serious CSRF vulnerabilities in some websites were documented [7], which allowed an attacker to transfer funds from victim's account to an account chosen by the attacker [7] as shown in listing 1. What makes detection or prevention of CSRF attack so difficult is the fact that web applications look to all requests triggered from an authenticated user's browser just like another.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Building a Robust Client-Side Protection Against Cross Site Request Forgery

Alameen¹

2015

ijacsa

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-In recent years, the web has been an indispensable part of business all over the world and web browsers have become the backbones of today's systems and applications. Unfortunately, the number of web application attacks has increased a great deal, so the matter of concern is securing web applications. One of the most serious cyber-attacks has been by cross site request forgery (CSRF). CSRF has been recognized among the major threats to web applications and among the top ten worst vulnerabilities for web applications. In a CSRF attack, an attacker takes liberty be authorized to take a sensitive action on a target website on behalf of a user without his knowledge. This paper, providing an overview about CSRF attack, describes the various possible attacks, the developed solutions, and the risks in the current preventive techniques. This paper comes up with a highly perfect protection mechanism against reflected CSRF called RCSR. RCSR is a tool gives computer users with full control on the attack. RCSR tool relies on specifying HTTP request source, whether it comes from different tab or from the same one of a valid user, it observes and intercepts every request that is passed through the user's browser and extracts session information, post the extracted information to the Server, then the server create a token for user's session. We checked the working of RCSR extension, our evaluation results show that it is working well and it successfully protects web applications against reflected CSRF.

show abstract

CsFire: Transparent Client-Side Mitigation of Malicious Cross-Domain Requests

Cited by 38 publications

References 4 publications

SessionShield: Lightweight Protection against Session Hijacking

SessionShield: Lightweight Protection against Session Hijacking

DEMACRO: Defense against Malicious Cross-Domain Requests

Building a Robust Client-Side Protection Against Cross Site Request Forgery

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About