CSR Participation Committees, Wildcat Strikes and the Sourcing Squeeze in Global Supply Chains

Abstract

Lead firms in apparel global supply chains are increasingly using social compliance programmes that require worker‐management participation committees in their supplier factories. These committees are designed to ensure respect for internationally recognized labour standards, to empower workers, and to reduce labour unrest. However, these committees have remained weak, and in countries such as Vietnam worker unrest remains common. This article argues that this is because lead firms in these CSR programmes are imposing a ‘sourcing squeeze’ on supplier factors by reducing the prices and production times they allot to their suppliers, which undermines efforts by committees to address cost‐sensitive issues and overtime violations. At the same time, the sourcing squeeze increases strike leverage, providing workers with a much more effective source of worker voice.

Does supply chain visibility affect operating performance? Evidence from conflict minerals disclosures

“…Firms can hardly claim to be dealing in ethical and sustainable goods, if their inputs are sourced in ways that are destructive to humans and the environment. This is especially true in the electronics and garment industries where firms may have sourced materials from jobbers and sub‐contractors without knowing that the items are produced in inhumane or environmentally detrimental work settings (Anner, ; Caro, Chintapalli, Rajaram, & Tang, ; Distelhorst, Locke, Pal, & Samel, ). We add to this literature by investigating how supply chain visibility—an important construct essential for improving sustainability in supply chains—also helps firms improve their operating performance, revenues, and market valuation.…”

Firm participation in voluntary regulatory initiatives: The Accord, Alliance, and US garment importers from Bangladesh

“…While "lead firms" vary in their sourcing behavior and differ in the control they exert over suppliers (Bartley and Child 2014, Bartley et al 2015, Gereffi et al 2005, Gereffi and Mayer 2010, retailers and brands are usually distant from production sites. Lead firms typically source from multiple factories, often in different countries, while individual factories often produce goods for several different lead firms and consumer markets (Anner 2018, Locke 2013, Osgood 2018. In the apparel sector, retailers and brands rely on market-based transactions to source inputs, cut and sew fabrics and complete final assembly 5 (Dallas 2015, Gereffi 2014.…”

“…The end of the agreement in 2004 heralded an era of increased competition (World Bank 2005). Brands, consumers and retailers' leverage over garment suppliers increased, as threats of exit became more credible (Anner 2018, Silver 2003.…”

Contested Understandings in the Global Garment Industry after Rana Plaza

“…Rahman and Rahman do not deal directly with how factory managers explain safety and labour standards violations in the garment industry, but they note reports by managers that the prices they receive have continued to fall even after Rana Plaza, as have their profits (a trend also noted by Anner, 2018). As one manager told them, 'On buyers' demand, we are investing a lot in compliance but they are not willing to give good prices for our products which could give us a minimum profit'.…”