1986
DOI: 10.1525/can.1986.1.3.02a00010
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Cultural Relativism and the Future of Anthropology

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Cited by 141 publications
(56 citation statements)
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“…For discussions of moral relativism that engage especially with anthropology, see Gellner (1985), Hollis andLukes (1982) Horton (1993), Jarvie (1984) and Wong (1984Wong ( , 2006. For more elaborate discussions of relativism and the history and future of anthropology, see Harris (2001: chs 9-13), Hatch (1983) and Spiro (1992). 11.…”
Section: Pluralism About Relations and The Objectivity Of Kinship Kmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For discussions of moral relativism that engage especially with anthropology, see Gellner (1985), Hollis andLukes (1982) Horton (1993), Jarvie (1984) and Wong (1984Wong ( , 2006. For more elaborate discussions of relativism and the history and future of anthropology, see Harris (2001: chs 9-13), Hatch (1983) and Spiro (1992). 11.…”
Section: Pluralism About Relations and The Objectivity Of Kinship Kmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Naive universalism has characterized some aspects of contemplative science thus far, as we have seen above in the case of grouping multiple diverse practices and traditions as "mindfulness"; it treats complex terms like "mindfulness," "consciousness," "mind," "compassion," "empathy," and "meditation" as if they required nothing more than a single-sentence definition, or no definition at all, even when investigating across traditions, or even across multiple traditions at the same time. 1 Equally problematic, however, is narrow particularism, characteristic of some research in the humanities and in cultural anthropology, which derives from cultural variability a case for cultural relativism [46]. It is reasonable to ask whether concepts like "compassion" can only be understood when situated fully within a historical, cultural, and religious context, and whether there is an essence to an emotion such as compassion that would mean that karun .ā (the Sanskrit word commonly translated as "compassion") in India 2000 years ago or snying rje (the Tibetan term) 1000 years ago bear a close resemblance to each other as well as to our contemporary understanding of the English word "compassion" in the early 21st century.…”
Section: Compassionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…1952: Hatch, 1983and Spiro, 1986: for additional studies based on this approach, see Friedman, 1989;Helwig. 1989;and Turieletal., 1990.…”
Section: Controversies Involving Moral Definition and Moral Variationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The more traditional interpretation [Williams, 1972;Spiro, 1986;Turiel, 1989] is that Herskovits asserts contradictory propositions. By asserting that the values and beliefs of different cultures are equally valid and cannot be judged from the perspec tive of any single culture, Herskovits com mits himself to what he says cannot be done, namely establishing a judgment that tran scends purported cultural biases.…”
Section: Controversies Involving Moral Variation and Moral Epistemologymentioning
confidence: 99%