Central to the postmodern project in anthropology is its critique of science and the scientific method, a critique which it shares with (because it was borrowed from) postmodernist thought more generally. However, unless otherwise specified, in what follows the terms postmodernist and postmodernism will refer to postmodernist anthropology specifically, not to postmodernism more generally. (For a superb survey of the history of postmodernist thought in general, see Harvey [1989], especially chapter 3.) The postmodernist critique of science consists of two interrelated arguments, epistemological and ideological. Both are based, however, on the central postmodern notion of subjectivity. First, because of the subjectivity of the human object, anthropology, according to the epistemological argument, cannot be a science; and in any event the subjectivity of the human subject precludes the possibility of science discovering objective truth. Second, since its much-vaunted objectivity is an illusion, science, according to the ideological argument, serves the interests of dominant social groups (males, whites, Westerners), thereby subverting those of oppressed groups (females, ethnics, third-world peoples). Since both of these arguments stem from the central emphasis that postmodernists place on subjectivity, my primary concern in this essay' is to assess the postmodernist interpretation and use of that critical concept. Hence, in what follows I shall do three things. First, I shall summarize those claims of the postmodernist view of subjectivity which, in my view, are valid. Second, I shall argue that although valid, these claims are not new, having been innovated many years ago by the founders of the Culture and Personality movement. Third, I shall argue that the postmodernist innovations have unfortunate consequences for anthropological scholarship. I A short version of this essay was presented to the Symposium on Postmodern Subjectivities at the 1993 annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association, organized by Claudia Strauss and Takie Lebra. I am indebted to David Jordan, Marc Swartz, and Donald Tuzin for their helpful criticisms of earlier drafts.
