Culture and Deception in Business Negotiations: A Multilevel Analysis

Triandis, Harry C.; Carnevale, Peter J.; Gelfand, Michele J.; Robert, Christopher; Wasti, S. Arzu; Probst, Tahira M.; Kashima, Emiko S.; Dragonas, Thalia; Chan, Darius K.-S.; Chen, Xiao Ping; Kim, Uichol; Dreu, Carsten K. W. De; Vliert, Evert Van de; Iwao, Sumiko; Ohbuchi, Ken Ichi; Schmitz, Paul G.

doi:10.1177/147059580111008

Cited by 151 publications

(138 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…A second limitation is that it is conducted within an English-speaking, Western cultural setting. Research has shown that an individualÕs willingness to engage in deception and their reactions to deception vary by culture (Triandis, 2001;Triandis et al, 2001). Unfortunately, all of our flights originated or terminated in the United States and our observations excluded any non-English interactions.…”

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confidence: 79%

Perceptions of Deception: Making Sense of Responses to Employee Deceit

Jehn

Scott

2007

J Bus Ethics

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ABSTRACT. In this research, we examine the effects that customer perceptions of employee deception have on the customersÕ attitudes toward an organization. Based on interview, archival, and observational data within the international airline industry, we develop a model to explain the complex effects of perceived dishonesty on observerÕs attitudes and intentions toward the airline. The data revealed three types of perceived deceit (about beliefs, intentions, and emotions) and three additional factors that influence customer intentions and attitudes: the players involved, the beneficiaries of the deceit, and the harm done by the perceived lie. We develop a model with specific propositions to guide organizations with respect to apparently deceitful behavior of their employees. Implications and directions for future research are provided, focusing on the question of whether organizations should consistently encourage honesty or train their employees to be effective liars.

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confidence: 79%

Perceptions of Deception: Making Sense of Responses to Employee Deceit

Jehn

Scott

2007

J Bus Ethics

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“…The cooperative incentive makes the situation particularly conducive to the exchange of honest and accurate information, because doing so successfully Lying and Deception 5 fosters high joint gain. The competitive incentive makes the situation particularly conducive to the use of misrepresentation and deception, because doing so successfully fosters one's immediate, personal self-interest (Triandis et al, 2001). Thus individuals in mixed motive interdependence find themselves in what has been called the "information dilemma"--should they provide accurate information to achieve high collective outcomes, or strategically misrepresent their preferences to foster good personal outcomes (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978;Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson, & Pillutla, 1999)?…”

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confidence: 99%

Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making.

Steinel

Dreu

2004

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

200

167

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Netherlands. Electronic mail can be sent to wsteinel@fsw.leidenuniv.nl. Lying and Deception 2 AbstractIn 4 experiments we examined lying and deception as a function of beliefs about other's cooperative or competitive motivation, and of own social value orientation. In a newly developed Information Provision Game, individuals gave information about payoffs that provided the basis for an interdependent other to make a decision affecting both parties' outcomes. Results showed that withholding information was associated with fear of being exploited, greed, and punitive sentiment, and that giving inaccurate information was associated with greed. Further, individuals gave less accurate and more inaccurate information when the other was competitive rather than cooperative, especially when they had a pro-social rather than selfish value orientation. Finally, individuals facing a competitive other misrepresented the decision problem as one of compatible rather than opposed interests, a tendency indicative of a "if you can't beat them, join them" strategy. Lying and Deception 3 Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision MakingIn his classic novel "The Adventures of Tom Sawyer," Mark Twain tells the story of Tom Sawyer, who is painting Aunt Polly's fence when Ben Rogers walks by, eating an apple and heading for the river to go for a swim. It is a beautiful day and when Ben asks why Tom is painting the fence rather than going for a swim, Tom decides not to answer truthfully--instead he tells Ben that he is actually enjoying himself and that painting the fence is an interesting and gratifying activity. Because Tom is so convincing, he actually raises Ben's desire to engage in whitewashing and, after some negotiation, Tom hands over the brush to Ben, and lies down in the shadow eating the rest of Ben's apple.By suggesting he loves whitewashing, and thus misrepresenting his true preferences, Tom Sawyer manipulates Ben Rogers to make a decision that is favorable to Tom. And although few of us may be as cunning and convincing as Tom Sawyer, we often find ourselves in situations where we can influence others by manipulating information and misrepresenting our true preferences and priorities. Tobacco companies misrepresent the addictive properties of nicotine (Tenbrunsel, 1998). Car owners deliberately conceal technical problems when trying to sell their car (Schweitzer & Croson, 1999). When negotiating a divorce, a husband may misrepresent the importance of having child custody to induce his spouse to concede on alimentation costs (O'Connor & Carnevale, 1997).Although lying and deception have been of interest to the social sciences for many decades, this research has mainly focused on animal and human ability to distinguish cheaters from non-cheaters (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992;DePaulo, 1992). Far less research has been concerned with what Tom Sawyer was doing--the active misrepresentation of values, preferences and priorities. Extending interdependence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978;Rusbult & Van Lange, ...

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“…The roles of deceit and trust are known to be different across cultures [5], [6]. Therefore, a multi-agent simulation of international trade that models the effects of deceit and trust should include the effects of culture.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As such, they are known to depend on cultural background [5], [6]. G. Hofstede's five dimensions of national cultures [7] are widely used to identify cultural differences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Multi-agent Model of Deceit and Trust in Intercultural Trade

Hofstede

Jonker

Verwaart

2009

Computational Collective Intelligence. Semantic Web, Social Networks and Multiagent Systems

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Abstract. Trust is a sine qua non for trade. According to transaction cost economics, a contract always offers some opportunity to defect. In the case of asymmetric product information, where the seller is better informed about product quality than the buyer is, the buyer either has to rely on information provided by the seller or has to check the information by testing the product or tracing the supply chain processes, thus incurring extra transaction cost. An opportunistic seller who assumes the buyer to trust, may deliver a lower quality product than agreed upon. In human decisions to deceive and to show trust or distrust toward business partners, issues like morality, shame, self-esteem, and reputation are involved. These factors depend strongly on trader's cultural background. This paper develops an agent model of deceit and trust and describes a multi-agent simulation where trading agents are differentiated according to Hofstede's dimensions of national culture.

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Culture and Deception in Business Negotiations: A Multilevel Analysis

Cited by 151 publications

References 24 publications

Perceptions of Deception: Making Sense of Responses to Employee Deceit

Perceptions of Deception: Making Sense of Responses to Employee Deceit

Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision Making.

A Multi-agent Model of Deceit and Trust in Intercultural Trade

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